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Abstract
Currently governments and research communities are concentrating on insider
threat matters more than ever, the main reason for this is that the effect of a
malicious insider threat is greater than before. Moreover, leaks and the selling of
the mass data have become easier, with the use of the dark web. Malicious insiders
can leak confidential data while remaining anonymous. Our approach describes
the information gained by looking into insider security threats from the multiple
perspective concepts that is based on an integrated three-dimensional approach.
The three dimensions are human issue, technology factor, and organisation aspect
that forms one risk prediction solution.
In the first part of this thesis, we give an overview of the various basic char-
acteristics of insider cyber-security threats. We also consider current approaches
and controls of mitigating the level of such threats by broadly classifying them
in two categories: a) technical mitigation approaches, and b) non-technical mit-
igation approaches. We review case studies of insider crimes to understand how
authorised users could harm their organisations by dividing these cases into seven
groups based on insider threat categories as follows: a) insider IT sabotage, b)
insider IT fraud, c) insider theft of intellectual property, d) insider social engin-
eering, e) unintentional insider threat incident, f) insider in cloud computing, and
g) insider national security.
In the second part of this thesis, we present a novel approach to predict ma-
licious insider threats before the breach takes place. A prediction model was
first developed based on the outcomes of the research literature which highlighted
main prediction factors with the insider indicator variables. Then Bayesian net-
work statistical methods were used to implement and test the proposed model by
using dummy data. A survey was conducted to collect real data from a single
organisation. Then a risk level and prediction for each authorised user within the
organisation were analysed and measured.
Dynamic Bayesian network model was also proposed in this thesis to predict
insider threats for a period of time, based on data collected and analysed on dif-
ferent time scales by adding time series factors to the previous model.
Results of the verification test comparing the output of 61 cases from the
education sector prediction model show a good consistence. The correlation was
ii
generally around R2 = 0.87 which indicates an acceptable fit in this area of re-
search.
From the result we expected that the approach will be a useful tool for security
experts. It provides organisations with an insider threat risk assessment to each
authorised user and also organisations can discover their weakness area that needs
attention in dealing with insider threat. Moreover, we expect the model to be
useful to the researcher’s community as the basis for understanding and future
research.
Keywords Cyber security insider threats; Privileged user abuse; Multiple
perspective approach; Insider threats predictions.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Organisations nowadays depend on computers in every aspect of their daily op-
erations, and because more than 80% of companies use remotely hosted services
on the cloud [93], most governments have started to centralise citizens’ informa-
tion in huge data service centres, while the citizens themselves also rely on cloud
computing to store their confidential data. All these make data theft easier. Most
of the decision makers in organisations and government are focusing on external
cyber-attacks such as unauthorised access to their networks, denial of service at-
tacks, viruses, Trojan Horses, Worms, etc. In order to protect such networks from
external attack, they spend around 10% of their IT budget on securing their assets
[93].
However, new evidence shows that both external attacks and insider threats
are significant [93], while the damage caused by insider attack is more damaging
than that of outsider attacks [36]. This means that anyone who has authorisation
to access organisation’s data assets is more dangerous than any other security
threat. Regardless of this, insider threat has been undervalued, and underestim-
ated.
Insider attacks are the most expensive form of information security breach, in
that the average cost per insider incident is £115,000 according to a recent report
by the Ponemon Institute LLC [73]. This is because the insider has knowledge
of, and access to, their employer’s assets, This has come about because such an
individual has had the trust of the organisation causing him or her to be supplied
with authorised access so that it is possible to bypass all physical and electronic
security measures.
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Figure 1.1: How Insider Threats are Handled
However, the number of insider threat incidents have continued to increase
to a significant extent. In fact, a recent study by the Ponemon Institute found
that 88% of IT experts believe that the risk of insider threat will stay the same
or increase in the next two years [72]. But more than three-quarters of these
incidents usually go unreported and are handled internally, with few referrals to
law enforcement agencies and no legal action taken, because of a lack of sufficient
evidence in order to prosecute the insider, or because organisations are concerned
about their reputation and negative publicity [11] [89]. Figure. 1.1 shows how
insider threats are handled.
Over the last ten years, there have been numerous studies that have tried to
define insider threat problems in order to come with one solution to solve current
security data breaches. In addition, security research incorporating survey results
in the last three years has shown an increase in insider threat breaches, with a
strong level of incident effects on organisations from the activities of insiders[89],
However, studies of insider threats prevention are divided into two main parts,
non-technical mitigation and technical mitigation - in which researchers have fo-
cused on the non-technical aspect even though technical controls have improved.
This is because privilege users are the greatest vulnerability to organisations. Part
of this is because these peoples’ knowledge of technical controls allows them to
avoid existing technical controls.
Considering the above information we define the problem statement for this
research as designing a new approach that helps organizations to mitigate the risk
level of insider threat by considering different techniques.
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1.2 Research Questions
Whether it is intentional or unintentional insider threat breaches carried out by
trusted people, what could be the approach that helps us to prevent of such threats,
and to deal with any potential insider breach before it can take place?
1.3 Aim and Objectives of the Study
The aim of this research, as established in our problem statement, is to design
and develop a prediction framework that will assist decision makers to eliminate
cyber security insider threat.
This thesis contains the context and details of a set of objectives we define as
necessary to present our final solution. These objectives provide a clear definition
of the scope of our work. The main objectives of the research are as follows:
• To review the current literature in the area of insider threat.
• To define the nature of the insider threat problem and identify various cat-
egories of insider threats.
• To present a new framework that help organisations to predict potential
malicious insider threats before a breach takes place.
• To implement the framework by modelling the proposed prediction frame-
work.
• To conduct empirical investigation “data collection”.
• To extend the proposed static prediction model to a dynamic model.
• To validate and test the proposed framework.
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1.4 Original Contributions
The study made during this PhD study has resulted in several contributions in
the field of insider threat mitigation to achieve the research aims and objectives.
The following list summarises the contributions this research achieves.
• We provide a detailed definition of the insider threat that makes a clear dis-
tinction between malicious or unintentional breaches, with the authorisation
access, that impact the information security goals (chapter 2).
• We divide the insider threat category into seven sub-categories, based on the
manner in which they affect the organisation’s information security goals
(confidentiality, integrity, and availability), and the human factors which
lead an insider to act in a malicious manner (motive, opportunity, and cap-
ability (chapter 2).
• An in-depth literature review of the current state of the art in insider threat
mitigation approaches. We classified these approaches into two main cat-
egories: a) technical mitigation approaches and b) non-technical mitigation
approaches. The limitations of the current insider threat mitigation ap-
proaches are identified (chapter 3).
• We propose a novel multiple perspective framework to help reducing the risk
of insider threat by predicting who could be an insider threat (chapter 4).
• We develop a computational statistical Bayesian model to implement the
proposed framework (chapter 4), and tested the model by data collected
using surveys (chapter 5).
• A dynamic insider threat prediction model with time series is proposed
(chapter 7).
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1.5 Research Methodology
In this thesis, a constructive research approach is used, which means problem-
solving through the construction of models, diagrams, plans, organisations, etc.
This method of research is widely used in technical sciences to develop a new the-
ory, algorithm, model, software, or a framework, to solve the research problem.
Kasanen et al. [50] characterised the constructive method by dividing the
research process into a number of stages, as listed:
• Find a practically relevant problem which also has research potential.
• Obtain a general and comprehensive understanding of the topic.
• Innovate, i.e., construct a solution idea.
• Demonstrate that the solution works.
• Show the theoretical connections and the research contribution of the solu-
tion concept.
• Examine the scope of applicability of the solution.
Our research is comprised of seven stages. The first addresses the literature
review, the second stage focuses on framework design, the third stage is on model
implementations, fourth stage is model test, fifth stage improves and extends the
prediction model, sixth stage is to validate the proposed prediction model, and
final stage is the conclusions, limitation, and any future Research. Figure. 1.2
shows flowchart of this research plan.
Stage 1: Literature Review.
• Setting the scope
• Find out insider threat categories.
• Find out insider threat approaches.
• Find out research caps.
• Publish paper based on the previous points.
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Stage 2: Framework Design.
• Multi-perspective approach thinking.
• To find out Key Insider Threat Indicators.
• To set up the relations between all indicators in a single framework.
Stage 3: Model Implementations.
• Choose the proper statistic method to calculate the prediction levels.
• Apply the proposed model to selected statistic application.
• Set the conditional probabilities for all nodes.
Stage 4: Model Test.
• Survey Design (Data Requirements)
• Survey Responded Data (Data Collection).
• Data Processing and Exploitation.
• Data Product (Predictive Analytics).
Stage 5: Validation of the Prediction Model.
• Choose the proper validation method to validate the result from prediction
model.
• Prepare a workshop for expert judgement discussion.
• Analyse the findings.
Stage6: Extending the Previous Model to a Dynamic Model.
• Choose the proper dynamic method to calculate the predicting levels.
• Design a new architecture for the insider threat prediction model.
• Run and test this model.
Stage 7: Conclusion, Limitation, and Future Research
• To discuss the final Conclusion.
• To conclude our work limitation.
• To find out any potential research based on our conducted work.
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Figure 1.2: Research Methodology and Plan
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1.6 Ethical Considerations
The project was reviewed and approved in according with the Loughborough Uni-
versity ethical clearance procedures for the School of Science. Participants were
fully informed by the aims and objectives of the study and the use of the data
collected at the start of the survey. Participants were informed of their right to
withdraw from the study at any point.
Data collected were treated as confidential and cannot be used or disclosed for
any other purpose. Further contact details of the researcher were made available
to all participants. Please refer to Appendix E for the ethical clearance form.
1.7 Overview of the Thesis
Chapter 2: Insider Cyber-Security Background
In this chapter, we provide the necessary background for topics discussed through-
out the thesis. We categorise different types of insider attack (e.g., sabotage, fraud,
theft of Intellectual Property) against the main security principles (confidential-
ity, integrity, availability),and also against human factors (motive, opportunity,
capability).
Chapter 3: Insider Threats Mitigation Approaches
In this chapter, a variety of current approaches in the context of insider threat de-
tection, were classified into two categories a)technical mitigation approaches, such
as intrusion detection systems, honey- tokens, access control systems, and secur-
ity information and event management systems. and b) non-technical mitigation
approaches, such as the psychological prediction models, and security education
and awareness. Both of these categories are required by organisations in order to
mitigate the insider threat problem.
Chapter 4: Insider Threat Risk Prediction Model
This chapter presents a new framework, the multiple perspective approach for
insider threat risk prediction. We apply Bayesian network statistical methods to
implement the proposed framework.
Chapter 5: Data Collection and Analysis
In this chapter, we evaluate the proposed model through the process of data collec-
tion by a survey, and modelling prediction result via Bayesian Network Software.
Here the outcome of this prediction result is aimed at helping decision makers
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to avoid insider threat breaches by indicating who could be a potential malicious
insider threat within the organisation.
Chapter 6: A Dynamic Model Approach for Insider Threats
In this chapter, we propose a new approach to predict insider threats over a period
of time, based on data collected and analysed on different time scales called a
dynamic model.
Chapter 7: Validation of the Prediction Model Results
In this chapter, We evaluate the prediction result by comparing the model result
with security expert’s judgements result, by using different statistical methods to
find how close the data are to the fitted regression line.
Chapter 8: Conclusions, Limitation, and Future Research
This chapter summarises our research and its findings and provides possible future
Research. Also, research limitation were discussed in this chapter.
Chapter 2
Insider Cyber-Security
Background
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we present the background information on insider threat; we start
with various definitions of insider threat, followed by discussion of main reasons
of misusing privileged access, Then, dividing insider threat categories into seven
categories, each category is explained with a case example.
2.2 Information Security
Information Security can be defined as the process by which digital information
assets are protected in order to ensure the three main security goals. These goals
are a) Confidentiality To ensure that information assets are not disclosed to
individuals or systems that are not authorised to receive them. It is also defined
as the process of making sure that data assets remain secret and confidential, and
that they cannot be viewed by unauthorised users, b) Integrity To ensure that
information assets cannot be modified by any other party without authorisation.
Integrity could also be described as the process that ensures that data assets are
the same as they were when they were originally created, without any change over
time, and c) Availability To ensure that information assets are available when
requested, It could also be described as a situation in which data assets should
be accessible for legitimate users when needed [92]. Figure 2.1 shows the main
security goals.
10
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Figure 2.1: Main Security Goals
2.3 Information Security Concepts
When we discuss information security, it is important and helpful that we mention
and understand terms like vulnerabilities, threats, and attacks on IT and Network
infrastructures, applications and services.
Vulnerability
Vulnerability is the weakness of an asset that is inherent in every IT and Net-
work infrastructure, application and service. It is the weakness that make threats
happen.
Threat
Threats refer to anything that has the potential to cause serious harm or damage
to the IT and Network infrastructures, applications and services, such as people
willing to take advantage of each security weakness which leads to attacks on your
asset.
Attack
Attack means the action taken to exploit vulnerability or to create a threat to the
IT and Network infrastructures, applications and services. Attack also could be
defined as any attempt to destroy, expose, alter, disable, steal or gain unauthor-
ised access to or make unauthorised use of an asset[47].
To summarise, a threat is a potential event that can adversely affect an asset,
whereas a successful attack exploits vulnerabilities in your system[59].
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2.4 Insider Threat Definition
Hunker[91] indicated that the research community has made little overall progress
in mitigating the insider threat problem; which is not because of lack of research
quality but rather from a lack of a framework to describe precisely what issues we
are trying to solve. One of these problem questions is “ What exactly is an
insider threat? ” The authors noted that “ if we cannot rigorously define the
problem we are seeking to solve, then how can we approach it, or even know when
the problem has been solved? ”.
To comprehend the definition of an insider threat, we should know what an
insider is and what a threat means in relation to information security. The in-
sider: A major workshop by the Advanced Research and Development Activity
RAND Corporation [8] that was held in 2004 defined the term of insider as: “an
already trusted person with access to sensitive information”. Greitzer et al. [30],
definition of insider is “an individual currently or at one time authorised to access
an organisation’s information system, data, or network ”. Bishop et al [7] also,
defined an insider in terms of trust that includes organisation assets as “ a person
that has been legitimately empowered with the right to access, represent, or de-
cide about one or more assets of the organisation’s structure ” , or simply as: an
individual who has logically or physically authorised access to any IT system.
A Threat, as in the previous section, refers to anything that has the potential
to cause serious harm or damage to an organisation’s IT systems or assets.
Then, what is an Insider Threat: the CERT Guide to Insider Threats [11]
defined Insider Threat as: “ A malicious insider threat is a current or former
employee, contractor, or business partner who has or had authorized access to
an organization’s network, system, or data and intentionally exceeded or misused
that access in a manner that negatively affected the confidentiality, integrity, or
availability of the organization’s information or information systems” . However,
CERT updated their definition in March 2017 to cover both malicious and un-
intentional acts as: “ the potential for an individual who has or had authorized
access to an organization’s assets to use their access, either maliciously or uninten-
tionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization”[21]; Also,
they developed a new diagram as shown in Figure 2.2 to assist further expansion
of the definition.
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Another definition by RAND is as follows: “ malevolent (or possibly inadvert-
ent) actions by an already trusted person with access to sensitive information and
information systems”. Also, Greitzer et al, in their paper argue that an insider
threat refers to: “ harmful acts that trusted insiders might carry out; for example,
something that causes harm to the organization, or an unauthorized act that be-
nefits the individual ” [30].
A simple definition by Pfleeger et al[71] is “ An insider’s action that puts at
risk an organization’s data, processes, or resources in a disruptive or unwelcome
way”.
Finally, the UK CPNI [19] define the insider threat is: “someone who exploits,
or has the intention to exploit, their legitimate access to assets for unauthorised
purposes ” .
Our definition for Insider Threats is as follows:
Any malicious or unintentional activities that cause damage to an organisation’s
IT and network infrastructure, applications, or services. On the part of an em-
ployee (current or former), contractor, subcontractor, supplier, or trusted business
partner. Who has or has had authorised access to the organisation’s IT assets.
And poses a significant negative impact on the information security elements (con-
fidentiality, integrity, and availability) of the organization.
Figure 2.2: Insider Threat Definition Scope by CERT
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2.5 Reasons for Misusing Privileged Access
Based on Wood’s assumption [95], an insider threat requires three factors for the
attacker to misuse his privileges: a) an insider attacker must have the motivation
to attack a motive , b) must identify a target an opportunity and c) must
be able to launch an attack a capability . A recent study by Colwill [17] reports
that insider attacks are made with varying degrees of motivation, opportunity and
capability. Motivation will come from internal, personal drives, whereas oppor-
tunity and capability will be given to insiders overtly by his/her former or current
organisation to perform their role, or may be attained covertly once they are on
the inside(191).
A motive:“The reasons for action - is what encourages an individual to act in
a certain way or at least develop an inclination for specific behaviour. It can also
be defined as the forces within an individual that push or drive him to satisfy his
needs [69]. Motivation for an insider attack can be for profit, revenge, sabotage,
provoking change, self-satisfaction, patriotism, stress, or ideological reasons [95]
[25].
An opportunity: This is a set of circumstances that makes it possible
for an insider to act out a malicious threat, with a low risk of being identified.
Opportunities can consist of privileges to access the system, system authorised
access level, extensive knowledge of the target, system role, or trust [95].
A capability this is the power or ability for a malicious insider to misuse his
privileged access to achieve his goal. This then leads to an insider threat security
breach. Capability can be through a set of skills, knowledge, and tactics on the
part of the insider with regard to an attack [95] [51]. Figure 2.3 shows the main
reasons for misusing privileged access.
2.6 Insider Threat Categories
We can divide the insider threat category into seven sub-categories, based on the
manner in which they affect the organisation’s information security goals (confid-
entiality, integrity, and availability), and the human factors which lead an insider
to act in a malicious manner (motive, opportunity, and capability).
We can also name the insider threat categories in term of the impact and the
actions that the insider uses to achieve his aims. These are: a) insider IT sab-
otage, b) insider IT fraud, c) insider theft of intellectual property, d) insider
social engineering, e) unintentional insider threat incident, f) insider in cloud
computing, and g) insider national security [11] [9] [14] [26]. However, organisa-
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Figure 2.3: Reasons For Misusing Privileged Access
tions could be affected by more than one category of malicious insider threat at
the same time.
Table 2.1 illustrates the relationship between those insider threat impact cat-
egories in term of the human factor when it comes to a malicious threat and the
effects on organisation’s information security goals. An example of this might be
an angry employee who wants revenge with regards to the company he has worked
for 10 years, after they informed him that he would lose his job in the coming 3
months. A way of revenge and self-satisfaction is by attacking the company’s IT
systems. Usually at this point the malicious insider has a high motive for sabot-
aging the IT systems with medium level capability and opportunity factors. In
most cases, the security system availability element will show the highest breach
level, rather than data integrity or data confidentiality.
Table 2.1: Insider Threat Categories
Impact Effect to Information Security Goals Reason for Misuse
Confidentiality Integrity Availability Motive Opportunity Capability
IT Sabotage Low Medium High High Medium Medium
Fraud Low High Low High High Medium
Theft of IP High Low Low High High Medium
Social Engineering High High High High Low Low
Unintentional Medium Medium Medium No Low Low
Cloud Computing Medium Low Low High High Low
National Security High High High High High High
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2.6.1 Insider IT Sabotage
Insider information technology (IT) sabotage are attacks in which the insider uses
his/her IT experience and knowledge to launch an attack on an individual or an
organisation. In general the attacker mainly targets the availability of the IT and
network infrastructure, applications and services, when they feel they are under
pressure or stress from their organisation or from colleagues. In general, insider IT
saboteurs are former employees, working remotely, without authorised access to
target systems, working outside normal hours, who prepare themselves and plan
the attacks, and use tools to launch such attacks. The main targets are databases,
systems, services, and network devices.
From the CERT insider threat cases database, an employee spreads rumours
across his organisation, that annual bonuses would be smaller than in previous
years. This drove a malicious IT employee to design and program a logic bomb
from a remote distance. He used authorised VPN access to move the malicious
program to all company servers as the foundation for his revenge if the rumour is
proved to be true. After he found out that the company was going to reduce the
annual bonuses of all staff, he resigned, and then set the logic bomb to go off two
weeks later. This deleted company files and disrupted thousands of servers across
the USA. However, the insider was convicted and sentenced to more than eight
years in prison [11].
It is clear that this piece of IT sabotage was caused by an employee wanting
revenge on his organisation in order to achieve self-satisfaction. Usually the em-
ployee has high stress levels caused by his organisation, or is aware of the danger
of losing his job.
2.6.2 Insider IT Fraud
Insider IT fraud is the case where an insider uses authorised access for personal
gain. This abuse can be in the form of creating, modifying, deleting or, in some
cases, selling confidential data assets. This fraud also affects data asset confidenti-
ality and integrity. Insider fraudsters in general are current employees, working in
an office, who have authorised access to information assets, are in a non-technical
position, who operate during normal hours, and who do not need tools to launch
the attack. The main insider target is information assets.
A case study of insider IT fraud published by the Department for Business In-
novation and Skills in the United Kingdom shows how a malicious insider working
for a large utility company, having authorised access to sensitive company inform-
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ation could harm the organisation’s confidentiality and profits by selling customer
data asset to competitors. However, the organisation accidentally discovered this
breach after months following a huge financial impact on their business. The value
of the losses was several hundred thousand pounds.
It is clear that IT fraud is caused by the greed of employees who work to
benefit themselves for financial gain. Usually the employee is suffering from high
financial pressures caused by the outside environment, and is unable to solve the
problem through legitimate means. This is what motivates the fraud crime in the
first place [83].
2.6.3 Insider Theft of Intellectual Property
Insider theft of intellectual property (IP) is that an insider uses the IT infrastruc-
ture to engage in espionage or steal information created and owned by the organ-
isation which employs him. Insider thieves of intellectual property in general are
current employees, or employees working in their resignation notice period, work-
ing in the office, who has authorised access to intellectual property. They tend to
hold technical positions such as scientists, programmers, engineers, or sales, dur-
ing normal hours, and do not need tools to launch an attack. The main insiders
targets are source codes, business plans, strategic plans, product information such
as designs formulas and schematics, and customer information [11].
In a case study of the theft of intellectual property in September 2013, a mo-
bile telecommunication company in Germany suffered a data breach caused by an
insider who had close knowledge of their IT infrastructure and system. He man-
aged to take a copy of more than two million customers’ records, such as customer
names, customer addresses, date of birth and bank account details [55].
The theft of intellectual property is usually done by someone who has been
a part of the process that creates the organisation’s intellectual property. They
think that the information asset belongs to them. Other types of people who steal
intellectual property are those who want financial gain for themselves.
2.6.4 Insider Social Engineering
Insider social engineering is when malicious insiders act to psychologically ma-
nipulate another innocent employee without their knowledge to disclose confid-
ential information or perform an action to harm the organisation’s IT, network
infrastructure, applications or services. However, insider social engineering occurs
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when the insider or outsider does not have the authorisation to access part of,
or all of, the organisation’s assets. Insider social engineering in general involves
an employee or outsider, using psychological manipulation, working inside normal
hours, preparing them selves and planning before the attack, involving a human-
based and technology-based attack. It may be a multiple-stage attack, on the part
of individual who does not have authorisation access to target systems, and uses
phishing tools to launch the attacks. The main targets are access user names and
passwords to a database, systems, services, and network devices.
From the CERT insider threat cases database, government organisations have
been the target to insider social engineering, in that employees have been tricked
by a phishing email sent to them regarding human resource benefits that exploited
a zero-day vulnerability and downloaded malicious code. The code hides itself on
the target system and acts as the back door for the outsider allowing the malicious
outsider to transfer government information [14].
It is apparent that insider social engineering is caused by someone who has
no authorised access to the target systems, and whose main reason for social
engineering is to sabotage the IT system, steal intellectual property, or commit
fraud using IT systems.
2.6.5 Unintentional Insider Threat Incident
An unintentional insider threat incident is one in which an authorised user ac-
cidentally performs an action to harm the organisation’s IT and network infra-
structures, applications or services, without the motive or intention to mount a
malicious attack [41]. Unintentional insiders in general are current employees,
working in the organisation’s office during normal hours, who have authorised ac-
cess to the target system, who causes an unplanned incident, without a target or
malicious motive.
A mistake by an accounts manager working in a pharmacy company in the
USA drove her company to fire her after performing an accidental security breach.
The unintentional insider downloaded a file containing the prescription informa-
tion of 6,000 patients with full patient details onto a USB memory stick, which
she then lost, because she did not realise that this was against company policy [75].
There is no doubt that unintentional insider threat incidents occur when the
victim has no security awareness training, poorly understands organisation secur-
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ity policy, poor management systems, work under high job pressure or stress, is
involved in difficult tasks with a lack of knowledge, and uses drugs [41] [9].
2.6.6 Insider in Cloud Computing
Insider in cloud computing or insider in service providers, are those working in-
side service provider company environments, who perform malicious insider actions
without the client’s knowledge in order to harm their data asset confidentiality.
However, there are neither possible ways of detecting such an attack during or
even after the breach, as the client has no control over service provider infrastruc-
tures or any effective method and tools to prevent such an attack. Insiders in the
cloud in generally current employees, working in a technical position, during nor-
mal hours, who have fully authorised access to target infrastructure, who are well
planned, and have a malicious motive. The main insider targets are data assets
such as databases, source codes, business plans, and strategic plans [26] [53] [96].
In a case study, an experienced IT administrator, working for a cloud com-
puting server provider, used his skills to act as a malicious insider. He managed
to take a copy of a client’s virtual machine file as part of his duties, and then
he broke into the client’s administrator account by using password cracking tools.
This gave him full access to the client’s operating system on the virtual machine
without the client’s knowledge.
Malicious threats from inside the cloud computing providers and caused by
their employees are increasing. Using their authorised access rights to the en-
vironment, they commit security breaches such as file recovery, coping virtual
machine files, and removing disks from a RAID.
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2.6.7 Insider National Security
Insider national security threats involve an insider using their authorised access
to represent a threat or do harm to a country’s national security. This threat can
include damage to the country through espionage, sabotage, disclosure of national
security information, or through the loss or degradation of departmental resources
or capabilities. Their main targets are the national security secret information.
The biggest intelligence leak in the U.S. history was launched by a malicious
insider (a trusted IT contractor and infrastructure analyst) who worked for the
National Security Agency (NSA). Edward Snowden managed to download mil-
lions of documents on classified intelligence collection programs, as he had the
authorised access to mass electronic surveillance data as part of his job. Then he
leaked classified material to media outlets. Since then he has released details of
unwarranted NSA hacking of friends and foe alike, the fallout damage U.S. rela-
tions abroad and putting a spotlight on current security issues facing the U.S.
Insider national security threats usually come from insiders as they have the
trust of the government. The motivations for their malicious actions are money,
psychology, accident, revenge or, as in Snowden’s case, “ My sole motive is to
inform the public as to that which is done in their name and that which is done
against them, I do not want to live in a world where everything I do and say is
recorded ” [37].
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2.7 Summary
The starting point of this study is to define the nature of the insider threat is-
sues and identify the various categories of insider threats. In this chapter, we
have provided the necessary background and literature review for the topics in the
thesis. We started by reviewing the definitions of insider threats from different
sources and we came out with one up-to-date definition of insider threats, that
includes malicious and unintentional insiders motivation. Finally we have cat-
egorised the different types of insider attacks into sabotage, fraud, IP theft, etc.
Based on the CIA security principles (confidentiality, integrity, availability), and
also human factors (motive, opportunity, capability) , which has been summarised
in Table 2.1.
Figure 2.4 shows the categories of insider threats. An organisation could be
targeted in any of the categories or more than one categories at the same time.
For example, a malicious insider could act to steal intellectual property by psycho-
logically manipulating another innocent user and use social engineering to obtain
higher privileges to access more resources.
In the next chapter, we will review the current approaches to mitigate the
insider threats and discuss their advantages and limitations to find the research
gaps.
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Figure 2.4: Summarise of Insider Threat Categories
Chapter 3
Insider Threats Mitigation
Approaches
Regardless of significant work over the last years, the research community has
made slight overall progress in mitigating the insider threat. As malicious insider
threat activities are still detected by individuals who are not part of the organisa-
tion’s security staff, with only one in five activities detected using a combination
of automated tools for logging, monitoring and flagging suspicious activity, along
with manual diagnosis and analysis [52] [97].
In this chapter, a research literature review of various approaches towards
insider threats and controls are presented in order to explain how we could mitig-
ate insider threat. These approaches can be broadly classified into two categories:
a) technical mitigation approaches and b) non-technical mitigation approaches.
3.1 Technical Controls to Identify Insider
Threats
In general technical controls are divided into two main categories: a) those that
look for unauthorised malicious activity, and b) those that look for changing in
behaviour that may indicate a malicious insider [31]. In addition to this, tech-
nical control tools could be implemented to concentrate on: a) network-based
activities, b) host-based activities, or c) cloud-based activities.
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3.1.1 Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) [82] defines Intrusion
Detection (IDS) as the process of monitoring the events occurring in a computer
system or network and analysing them for signs of possible incidents, which are
violations or imminent threats of violation of computer security policies, accept-
able use policies, or standard security practices. It also defines IDSs as software
that automates the intrusion detection process.
Intrusion Detection Systems deployed to detect malicious intruders in real time
originate from external threats, and are based on monitoring networks or endpoint
devices through analysing activities and traffic patterns from any abnormal beha-
viour in the network and endpoint, or through matching the activities and traffic
with a database of attack signature.
When intrusion detection system detects abnormal behaviour or an attack
signature it initiates a security alert. As IDS gathers information over different
platforms in real time, it is a helpful tool for discovering a malicious insider by
analysing information of any change of user behaviour or activity that may lead
to data breaches [2] [6].
However, IDS has its limitations in dealing with insider threats such as: a high
number of false alarms, a huge database log file size, and requiring an administrator
to analyse the traffic and behaviour. In addition, it cannot monitor encrypted
traffic [97]. Furthermore, Cyber-Security Centre at the University of Oxford [26]
concluded that IDSs are far from ideal for detecting insiders as they are primarily
focused on external attackers and have a tendency to identify false positives.
3.1.2 Security Information & Event Management (SIEM)
Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) is a tool that is respons-
ible for centralising and analysing logging in one management platform, it col-
lects information through secure network channels from various security-related
logs (ranging from client workstations and servers to application servers, antivirus
software, network devices, honeypots, firewalls, IDSs), and any other sensors in
the network, then correlating the events among them in a database by matching
any related characteristics and events [28] [87].
This approach allows the information security administrator to quickly search
for events and possibly identify malicious insider activity before it occurs, or as a
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data-mining tool and evidence for forensic investigations after the accident occurs
[88] [13].
3.1.2.1 Universal Serial Bus (USB) Device Auditing to Detect
Possible Data Exfiltration by Malicious Insiders
Lewellen et al [88] implemented an approach to audit the use of USB device within
a Microsoft Windows environment. In their approach they wrote batch scripts,
installed in all user devices with host-based intrusion-detection system (HIDS).
Any activity done by users will be logged into log centre, by which information
technology professionals analyse these logs for any malicious insider threat. Figure
3.1 shows a snippet of code from the usbHistory.bat script [88].
Figure 3.1: USB History.bat Script
3.1.3 Data Loss Prevention (DLP)
Data Loss Prevention (DLP) is a technology responsible for the early detection of
data exfiltration attempts by a malicious or unintentional insider. It is performed
in three steps:
• system discovery - scanning storage devices, capturing network data flow,
and watching user behaviour on endpoint devices.
• leaked confidential data identification - information discovered in the system
discovery step could be identified if they are secret information in three ways:
keyword matching, regular expressions, or hashing fingerprinting.
• organisation policy enforcement - this step prevents any action that could
cause any security breach in identified confidential data in the previous step
[43].
The benefit of using a data loss prevention approach is that we can use it to
protect three types of data in an organisation, or part of any type, depending on
business need. These types are:
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• Data at rest - refers to inactive data or static data that is stored physically
on enterprise devices.
• Data in motion - refers to data captured in the moment of data traffic flow.
• Data in use - refers to active data assets under constant change, data in
operation as they are processed by applications or endpoint agents [91] [43]
[34].
However, these research groups use this technology to deploy new insider threat
potential approaches such as: web traffic inspection [34] [56]; Virtual Private Net-
work (VPN) data flow monitoring; and Correlating Events from Multiple Sources
such as Universal Serial Bus (USB) [88] [86].
3.1.3.1 Traffic Inspection Approach
Silowash et al [34], developed a new system to detect and prevent data exfiltra-
tion through encrypted web sessions via traffic inspection, Their system acts as a
Man-in-The-Middle1 Proxy, where MiTMs is a type of attack that interrupts and
inspects all uploaded attachment message encrypted with SSL encryption[29].
First they install Squid2 to be working as MiTM over Ubuntu Linux platform.
Afterwards they scan outbound web-based traffic using C-ICAP3 and ClamAV4.
Finally redirect all clients requests to a proxy server by using Certificate. Figure
3.2 shows traffic inspection network structure [34].
Figure 3.2: Traffic Inspection Network Structure
1Man-in-The Middle (MiTM) attack is a form of eavesdropping where communication
between two users is monitored and modified by an unauthorized party.
2Squid is a caching proxy for the Web supporting HTTP, HTTPS, FTP.
3C-ICAP is an implementation of an ICAP server. It can be used with HTTP proxies that
support the ICAP protocol such as the Squid server to implement content adaptation/filtering
services.
4ClamAV is an open-source, GPL licensed, anti-virus engine
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It is important to note that, this approach could prevent intellectual property
leakages with only tagged attached file. That means we need to tag all documents
with known tag to proxy server to generate a signature, such as:
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY: 0 : *
:464f52204f4646494349414c20555345204f4e4c59
3.1.3.2 HTTPS Traffic Inspection Approach
In the previous approach Silowash et al [34] did not add the scenario if an insider
copied intellectual property and past the text into the body of webmail message.
Consequently, Lewellen [56], implemented a new system based on the previous
approach to inspect text-based HTTP/S traffic, to block the connection in near
real time. To do this they have added java text indexer (Apache Lucene) to Squid
proxy server.
The threat of these approaches is that the proxy server will act as a Intellectual
Property warehouse, which could bean attack target for malicious insiders.
3.1.4 Access Control System
Access control is the system that manages and controls the access credentials to
specific electronic resources based on a) authentication “ who you are”, and b)
authorisation “what you are authorised to do” components, in relation to the se-
curity policy of an organisation. The rules are based on different principles such
as: a) least privilege, b) privilege escalation, and c) separation of task duties
[46] [20].
Whether using Role-Based Access Control (RPAC), Mandatory Access Con-
trol (MAC), or Discretionary Access Control (DAC) models, the insider threat
is granted access by system authentication and is authorised to perform the ne-
cessary tasks. An access control system ensures that an organisation’s security
administrators have control of their asset and they can change the authorisation
access level, or deny access at any time, when needed [81].
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3.1.5 Honey-tokens
A honey-token is a method used to attract malicious insiders, and help to detect,
identify and confirm a malicious insider threat [90]. Moreover, it may be effective
in catching insiders who are snooping around a network. The honey-token is a
technique that is a part of honeypot technology. However, it is different to other
types because it could be any interactive digital entity, such as a Microsoft Office
document, rather than a hardware device or software.
The main concept is that no one should interact with the trap, and any inter-
action with the digital entity will indicate to the security administrator that there
could be the threat of a malicious insider.
As an example, if a company general manager (GM) suspects that one of his
information technology (IT) staff is checking his emails, owing to the fact that an
IT employee has full authorisation to access to emails, then they could use the
honey-token approach to generate an email to the GM. This email should contain
interesting information to attract an insider. Then, this honey-token leads the
insider to use a user-name and password within the email to access the honey-
token, as no one else has the user name and the password. When a malicious
insider accesses the URL, insider information such as the IP address, device name
and user domain name will be sent to the IT security team to deal with this breach.
From: Human.Resource@example.com
Subject: Important HR System Login
Date: Thu, 15 Jun 2015 06:11:44 +0800
To: GM@example.com
Dear GM,
please find below your new login and password for our new HR system.
You could use this information to view all employees information.
Please Do Not Share This Information With Anyone.
URL:https://hr.example.com/login.php. Login: GM001. Password: Gm001.
CHAPTER 3. INSIDER THREATS MITIGATION APPROACHES 29
3.2 Non-Technical Approaches
From the fact that insider threat “is a people problem” and “the trust we give”,
mitigating the threat level of a malicious insider is a difficult issue that requires
dealing with human behaviour, instead of only dealing with this issue by using a
technical approach. As we have seen in the past five years whistle-blowers have
managed to avoid all major technical controls. At this point, institutions and
researchers should start to look into the problem of insider threats from different
points of view, such as - a) prediction, b) training and awareness, and c)
security policy.
3.2.1 Psychology Prediction Model
Based on the psychology of user behaviours, researchers have found psychology in-
dicators related to a malicious insider threat. These three factors are: a) insider
attackers must have the motivation to attack, “a motive”, b) they must identify
a target, “an opportunity” and c) they must be able to launch an attack, “a
capability” [84].
Axelrad et al. [1] proposed a model to predict insider threats. The motivation
behind their approach is to define 83 psychological variables potentially associated
with insider threats. The approach was to analyse these variables and estimate
a score power to each variable. Variables include: a) dynamic environmental
stress, such as life and job stress; b) personal characteristics, such as job satis-
faction; c) insider actions, such as personal attitude; and finally, d) the degree
of interest, such insider threat profile.
To generate a single score to measure degree of interest for each authorised
person they used Bayesian Network5, Figure 3.3 shows Bayesian network vari-
ables and structure [1]. However, the downside of their approach is depending on
judgement of the score estimates of each variable of 83 variables.
Greitzer et al. [38] [40] proposed another classification method for malicious
insider threats based on the case studies of previous insider crimes. Their ap-
proach began with setting 12 indicators associated with insider threats. These
are: a) disgruntlement, b) not accepting feedback, c) anger management
issues, d) disengagement, e) disregard for authority, f) performance, stress,
g) confrontational behaviour, h) personal issues, i) self-centredness, j) lack
5Bayesian Network is a probabilistic graphical model that represents a set of random
variables and their conditional dependencies via a directed acyclic graph
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Figure 3.3: Bayesian Network Variables and Structure
Figure 3.4: Greitzer’s Risk Indicators
of dependability, and finally k) absenteeism. Figure 3.4 shows Greitzer’s risk
indicators classified by the weights of the indicator to risk levels.
Both models in this section claim to help decision makers to determine whether
the user is a potential malicious insider threat or not, based on scoring indicators
[65]. However, no evidence of any kind of real implementation of these models
approves their claim.
3.2.2 Security Education and Awareness
Insider threat accidents could be avoided by the appropriate security education
and awareness training [85], especially the category of the unintentional insider
threat. The Ponemon Institute [72] reports that 62% of organisations conduct
regular privileged user training programmes as part of their efforts to protect the
organisation from insider threats, with 11% of the IT budget allocated to security
education and awareness .
Educational and awareness training could include the following areas: a)
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presentations by outside speakers, b) classroom courses, c) on-line training
courses, d) the organisation’s internal website, email and social media newsletters
update feeds, and e) printed leaflets. Training objectives may include: a)
incident reporting procedures and responsibilities, b) consequences and sanctions,
c) handling of sensitive information, d) intellectual property protection, e)
insider threat indicators, f) social engineering scams, and g) unintentional
leaking.
3.2.3 Information Security Policy
Organisation’s information security policies deliver the framework that sets the
most critical controllers within the organisation once the organisation’s objectives
have been identified. It comes in a detailed statement of employees’ expectations
of an organisation, and what is expected from them in terms of information secur-
ity, and the acceptable behaviour and culture within the organisation [48] [66] [78].
A recent paper by the Cyber Security Centre at the University of Oxford [9]
focused on the ability of an organisation’s information security policies to mitigate
the level of a malicious insider threat. In their paper they pointed out the fact that
the risk of an unintentional insider threat is potentially more pressing than that
posed by other malicious insider categories. From this point, they found that 45%
of employees do not follow security policies for two main reasons: a) the policy
was incomplete or poorly defined; or b) the employee was not aware of the security
policy. They conclude in their paper that if the information security policy is not
followed by all authorised users the unintentional insider treat level will increase.
In September 2014, the USA Department of Defence issued a directive that
establishes and ensures appropriate national insider threat policy within the De-
partment of Defence. This prevents, deters, detects, and mitigates actions by
malicious insiders who represent a threat to the USA’s national security, or De-
partment of Defence personnel, facilities, operations, and resources [24], and that
will help to reduce insider threat levels.
From the previous two sections on technical controls and non-technical controls,
we can summarise the benefit and the limitation of each insider threats approaches
that are described in previous sections on Table 3.1 .
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3.3 Techniques and Psychology Prediction
Model
Kandias et al. [51] proposed an insider threat prediction model, which focuses
on combining two approaches, techniques and psychology6. First part of their
model is analysing misbehaviour in information systems in real time, based on
information gathered from Honeypot7, Intrusion Detection System8, and system
calls9. Second part of their model is analysing psychological profiling component
such as stress level, system role, and user sophistication. Figure 3.5 shows insider
threat prediction model [51].
Figure 3.5: Insider Threat Prediction Model
To allow management team to predict a potential insider threat, they have
discovered a relationship between all parameters collected from psychological pro-
filing and technical control sources with the three factors motive, opportunity, and
capability. where each factor receives an assessment score of the following form:
low (1-2), medium (3-4) , and high (5-6) .
6Psychology is the scientific study of the human mind and its functions, especially those
affecting behaviour in a given context.
7Honeypot is a trap set to detect, deflect, or, in some manner, counteract attempts at
unauthorised use of information systems.
8Intrusion Detection System(IDS) (IDS) is a device or software application that monitors
network or system activities for malicious activities
9System Calls is how a program requests a service from an operating system’s kernel that
it does not normally have permission to run.
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Motive of a user Mi is assessed using three parameters: predisposition to
malicious behaviour Pi, stress level Si, and skill verification Vi.
Mi = f(Pi + Si + Vi) (3.1)
To measure level of predisposition to malicious behaviour they used the Com-
puter Crime Index and Social Learning Questionnaire10 (CCISLQ)[79]. Second
parameter to measure is the stress level which is based on psychometric test[74],
evaluating both personal and professional stress. Finally, skills verification level
declared users’ skills during the psychometric test.
Opportunity for a user Oi is assessed using three parameters: change of work
behaviour Bi, system role Ri, and honeypot use Hi.
Oi = f(Bi + Ri + Hi) (3.2)
Change of work behaviour measured during the interaction with the IT infra-
structure could indicate that a user is in the process of finding a possible target in
the system. Second parameter to measure is user systems role which is based on
user organisational structure position, which can be “novice, “advanced or “ad-
ministrator”, Finally, if user interacts with the honeypot system, it will indicate
a high risk of an attack.
Capability for a user Ci is assessed using two parameters: Demonstrated Cap-
ability Di, and User Sophistication Si.
Ci = f(Di + Si) (3.3)
Demonstrated capability is measured by system call analysis tools and IDS,
where User Sophistication is measured from user psychometric test.
Threat score Ti is measured using a simple scoring system, the sum of Motive,
Opportunity, and Capability. Ti reflects the user into four scouring categories: no
risk (3, 4), medium risk (5, 6), high risk (7, 8), and very high risk (9).Table 3.2
shows overall thereat score of Ti [51].
Ti = f(Mi + Oi + Ci) (3.4)
However, there are limitations in their approach. First limitation is on IDS,
as it depends on monitoring the ports of network switches (SPAN switched port
10CCISLQ is a PhD thesis at Department of Psychology, University of Manitoba Winnipeg,
Manitoba
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Table 3.2: Threat Scour
Motive Opportunity Capability
Low Medium High
Low
Low 3 4 5
Medium 4 5 6
High 5 6 7
Medium
Low 4 5 6
Medium 5 6 7
High 6 7 8
High
Low 5 6 7
Medium 6 7 8
High 7 8 9
analysis), which cannot analyse encrypted data or traffic over encrypted channels
such as secure virtual private network (VPN) or secure web connection using Se-
cure Sockets Layer (SSL)11. Second limitation is on using system logs as any action
taken in the system should be logged and be processed in the real time, which will
be limited by the resources and performances of information infrastructure.
3.4 A Framework for Characterising Attacks
Approach
A framework for characterising insider attacks has been proposed byCyber-Security
Centre at University of Oxford [64][9]. They started with collecting 80 insider
threats cases from the UK’s Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure
(CPNI) [19], CMU- CERT[11], and published reports. Additional to that they
collect data by creating a survey, then they started analysing collected data by
adopting grounded theory approach12.
Figure 3.6 shows the framework they proposed, which contains four classes of
components: a) Catalyst refers to the overarching reason for the incident, b)
Actor characteristics which capture the state of the insider, c) Attack character-
istics detail the elements relating to the attacker, d) Finally organisation char-
acteristics include organisational assets and the vulnerability, while solid arrows
indicate a definite relationship between the elements and dashed lines potential
relationships[64].
11Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) is a standard security technology for establishing an encryp-
ted link between a server and a client
12Grounded Theory is a qualitative research approach, which is a systematic methodology
in the social sciences involving the discovery of theory through the analysis of data
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3.5 Summary
In previous years, organisations, governments and armed forces all around the
world, have failed to mitigate malicious insider threats through their regular se-
curity measures. Moreover, these kinds of security breaches have started to affect
our entire society. In this chapter, we have considered the current approaches and
controls associated with mitigating the level of insider threats.
The main approaches presented in this chapter have been classified into two
categories: technical mitigation and non-technical mitigation approaches. Their
advantages and drawbacks for each of these techniques have been summarised in
Table 3.1.
The approaches presented in this chapter can prevent and reduce the risk of
insider threats, Unfortunately we have found that there is no one solution, which
can fully eliminate insider threats within an organisation. In addition, a technical
approach by itself may not be the most effective way to prevent and detect mali-
cious insider threats.
It has been concluded that no single approach alone could solve the security
problem. In order to mitigate insider threats more research in the domain of in-
sider cyber-security threats is needed, and the right approach should be identified
for dealing with malicious insider threat from different perspectives.
In the next chapters, we will propose and implement a new framework that will
helps organisations to prevent from such threats and to deal with any potential
insider breaches before it takes place, by adopting the three perspective approaches
and extend the hybrid approaches that we have discussed in this chapter.
Chapter 4
Insider Threat Risk Prediction
Model
4.1 Introduction
Insider threat issue is complex for the researcher community to address, and to deal
with this kind of security breach we have to think differentially, as most of previ-
ous approaches address this problem from one aspect - usually a technical solution
which is applied to particular applications or systems. We conducted our research
using an applied constructive research methodology and injected with other meth-
odologies such as empirical Bayes’ methods and a quantitative 1 method that is
related to data collection and analysis.
The novel aspect of this study is that we adapt a multiple perspective approach
to mitigate malicious insider threats. The term perspective is used to distinguish
how we are looking at what we are looking at. Linstone et al. [57] first proposed
a socio-technical approach using multiple perspective concepts in the 80s with re-
gard to applications in terms of technology assessment. The three-dimensions this
research is focusing on are: a) personal b) organisational and c) technical
perspectives.
Socio-technical approach is a methodology for complex organisational work
design that identifies the interaction between people and technology in the work-
place. The term also refers to the interaction between human behaviour and
society’s complex infrastructures.
In addition, McCumber et al. [58] presented a security measures model in nine
1Quantitative method Explaining phenomena by collecting numerical data through polls,
questionnaires, or surveys that are analysed using statistical, mathematical, or numerical analysis
methods.[61]
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distinct boxes, each three layers deep to help us understand the comprehensive
nature of information security. The three layers are: a) technical b) policy
and practice and c) education, training and awareness. However, it is rare to
see any insider threat approach or a real application which has implemented the
multiple perspective concept. Figure 4.1 shows the McCumber model.
Figure 4.1: McCumber Model
4.2 The Framework
In this thesis we developed a new framework that helps organisations to predict
potential malicious insider threats before a breach takes place. The emergency
insider threat risk prediction framework is based on a multiple perspective ap-
proach integrated with Key Insider Threat Indicators; we predict who could be an
insider threat based on the three-dimensions calculation: a) Technology Aspect,
b) Organisational Impact, and c) Human Factor. Moreover, every dimension in
this framework is divided into a number of layers. Figure 4.2 shows the proposed
insider threat risk prediction framework.
Where in this figure, the middle triangle represents prediction risk levels of
insider threat, layer one represents our main three-dimensions, layer two and three
represent Key Insider Threat Indicators;
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4.2.1 Human Factor Dimension
As the human factor is always the weakest link in the information security chain,
human factors in the context of insider threat started to gain increased attention,
mainly where the use of security technologies has failed to protect organisations
from malicious or unintentional insider threat [44, 42]. Researchers have argued
that insiders have specific psychological characters (behavioural indicators) that
need to be under our attention when measuring the level of insider threat risk [65].
In this dimension we measured each authorised user’s psychological profiling
level. Based on Wood’s assumption,[95] a malicious insider threat requires three
factors before it comes to the attacker misusing his privileges. These are: Motiv-
ation, Opportunities and Capabilities. To measure these factors, we designed our
model based on these assumptions as listed below:
• The employee’s motivation to act as a malicious insider threat, are com-
plex and multifaceted to measure, where it’s common for abusers to have
more than one motivation for their actions. In this proposed framework
motivations are measured by work related stress levels, such as considering
autorised users attitude towards the workplace, the support that employees
get from line manager or colleagues, relationships between colleagues, and
the knowledge of organisation securit policy. Also, employee age and gender
affect motive levels.[68, 19, 38, 45, 65]
• The opportunities that authorised users have to enact any malicious in-
sider threat, as human are expected to realise their intentions when the
opportunity arises. in this proposed framework opportunities are measured
by autorised user system role, contract expiration dates, and their relation-
ship to the organisation (current employee, formal employee, contractor,
etc).[19, 60, 88, 35]
• The capabilities factor is to measure the ability and skills of employees
have to act on any kind of security breach, where insiders have the priv-
ileges and access rights to organisation data assets for a long time that gives
the autorised users to know what security measures in place are. We meas-
ured the capabilities levels through, for example, employees’ access rights to
intellectual property and their work knowledge. [4, 60, 49]
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4.2.2 Technology Aspect Dimension
Most medium and large organisations have their own Information Technology (IT)
department. One of their critical roles is to ensure that they protect an organisa-
tion’s information assets from any type of security breach [27] such as intellectual
property (IP) data leaks. To do this, organisations need to invest in IT secur-
ity, and also invest in carrying out security awareness training for all authorised
users. Then organisations should implement some tools and controls to monitor
their systems and take the right action before or after a breach has taken place.
Finally, organisations should regularly evaluate their system, and make sure that
all security measures are in place.
In our approach, the technology aspect domain is focused on the IT department
within the organisation under consideration; we collected information related to
the organisation’s IT security measures, and how it ensures that insider threat
breaches are kept to a minimum. To measure the technology factor level, we
collected information in the following three categories:
• Balance Investment: between outsider and insider threats is a key to show
how executive managers are aware of insider threat breaches. In investment
we look into: security awareness and training, and budget spending aimed
at minimising the threat from malicious or unintentional insider sources.
[17, 93, 94]
• Detection level: an important aspect is to measure the level of detection of
previous insider attacks with the proportion of false alerts and the techniques
used to detect previous insider threat cases, if there is any.[90, 43]
• Security and privacy controls: in this category, we focused on forensic
evidence, such as network traffic and email logs.[16] In addition, we measured
system integrations in terms of detecting insider threats, technical tools and
controls (such as security information and event management), and data
loss prevention, which organisations commonly use to avoid any security
breach.[39, 49, 97, 18]
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4.2.3 Organisational Impact Dimension
The UK’s Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI) [19] has
found that “ where an insider act takes place there is often an exploitable weak-
ness with the employers own protective security or management practices which
enables the insider to acting ”. Organisational issues that may affect the risk levels
of insider threat should be identified.
In this proposed framework, the organisational impact dimension represents
information related to how organisations are structured, and how they manage
insider threat breaches. To measure the organisational aspect level, we collect
information in the following four main categories:
• Security breaches: In this category, we focused on the history of any
kind of security breach and also collecting information regarding malicious
or accidental insider breaches in the last five years [94]. The other part of
this category is the action the organisation has taken in respect to any such
previous breaches. [63]
• Structure: Here, we collected information in relation to the recruiting pro-
cedure, pre-employment screening and IT department outsourcing services
[19].
• Security policy: This is all the information related to the organisation’s
security policies: whether they have one and they believe that it is followed
by all authorised users or not. [10]
• Employee work-related stress symptoms: In this category we collect
information relating to the visible stress symptoms to top managers for over-
all employees that affect the organisation’s productivity, such as: increas-
ing accidents, increasing long-term illnesses, and poor performance in tasks.
[67][1]
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4.3 Modeling Framework
Bayesian network statistical methods were used to implement and test the pro-
posed framework. This is because we can represent the probabilistic relationships
between all factors (Human, Organisation, and Technology) by using a directed
acyclic graph. where each factor has dependency relation condition with other
variable in various layers.
The term Bayesian Networks (BN) was coined by Judea Pearl in 1985 [70]
and, in recent years, a number of insider threat approaches have started to rely
on this statistical method to implement their models. For example, Greitzer et
al. deployed a psychosocial model to assess employee behaviour associated with
an increased risk of insider abuse based on a BN model [40]. Also, Axelrad et
al. introduced a BN model of the motivation and psychology of malicious insider
threats [1].Moreover, in the cyber-security fields such (Forensic, risk management)
BN is increasingly in popular modelling technique. [15].
A Bayesian network is a Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) in which each node
is a collection of random variables of X. The set of random variable values Xi
can be referred to as the space of X , where the joint probability distribution of
variables of X is {X1, X2, . . . , XN} .
A network structure specifies the dependency relation condition of variables in
X. Each node in the network has a one-to-one relationship with one space of X.
If a node is conditionally independent of its non-descendants given its parents,
with a graph network implemented based on the order of the parent’s node before
its children, as (1, 2, . . . ..N). This means that we can find the representation of a
Bayesian network joint probability distribution as follows, based on the multiplic-
ation law.
P (X) = P (X1, X2, . . ., XN) = P (XN |XN−1, XN−2, . . .X1) . . .P (X2|X1)P (X1)
(4.1)
=
N∏
i=1
P (Xi|X1 :i−1) (4.2)
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=
N∏
i=1
P (Xi|Parents(X i)) (4.3)
where X1 :i−1 = (X1, X2, . . .Xi−1), and Parents(X i) are the parents of node
Xi, this formally shows that node Xi is dependent on its parents only and is in-
dependent of all its ancestors.
For example, Figure 4.3 represent a simple example to implement a BN. In
this example the wet grass (W) can either be caused by rain (R) or by a water
sprinkler (S). Where clouds (C) make it less likely that the sprinkler will turn on,
but more likely that it will rain.
Based on the previous formulation 4.3, we can represent Figure 4.3 as follows:
P (C, S,R,W ) = P (C)P (S|C)P (R|C)P (W |R, S) (4.4)
Figure 4.3: Simple Bayes Network Sprinkler Example.
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Figure 4.4: A Snapshot of Gender Distribution Editor and Domain
In our approach we went through three stages to implement and develop the
model for the proposal framework: a) network construction, b)Prior probabilities,
and c) Risk output.
4.3.1 Network Construction
In this phase the network is constructed with linked conditional nodes with dif-
ferent variables that each end node takes one value from a collected data. In
our model, we divided the network into three main domains based on the three-
dimension factors. Figure 4.5 shows the insider threat risk prediction network
model.
4.3.2 Prior Probabilities
After creating all nodes, and linking each child nodes to their partners, we then
assigned prior probabilities to each random variable in the network. These priors,
which were estimated by us based on literature reviews and domain expert exper-
ience, reflect the frequencies at which random variables take on values from their
domains. For example, the prior probability that an employee’s gender is male,
given the probability of (age, gender and policy) is high, is 82 % [19] [60]. Figure
4.4 shows a snapshot of gender distribution editor and domain.
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4.3.3 Risk output
The purpose of this phase of deploying a Bayesian network is to calculate the
effects of the random variables on each internal node until we get to the central
node which called Emergency Insider Threat Risk Predictions (E).
The probability of insider threat (E) given human factor (H), organisational
impact (O), and technology aspect (T), can be generated based on these steps:
P (E,H,O, T ) = P (E | H,O, T )P (H,O, T ) (4.5)
= P (E | H,O, T ) P (H|O, T ) P (O, T ) (4.6)
= P (E | H,O, T ) P (H|O, T ) P (O | T ) P (T ) (4.7)
This is based on the multiplication law, where P(O,T)= P (O | T ) P (T )
= P (T | O) P (O)
Also
P (E,H,O, T ) = P (H | E,O, T )P (E,O, T ) (4.8)
= P (H | E,O, T ) P (E|O, T ) P (O | T ) P (T ) (4.9)
Also
P (E,H,O, T ) = P (O | E,H, T )P (E,H, T ) (4.10)
= P (O | E,H, T ) P (E|H,T ) P (H | T ) P (T ) (4.11)
Also
P (E,H,O, T ) = P (T | E,H,O)P (E,H,O) (4.12)
= P (T | E,H,O) P (E|H,O) P (H | O) P (O) (4.13)
From the joint distributions we can get the Bayes formula.
First we can conclude that:
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Equation’s 4.7 = Equation’s 4.9 = Equation’s 4.11 = Equation’s 4.13
According to Bayes’ Rule, therefore, one option is to rearrange the above to
get:
P (E | H,O, T ) = P (H | E,O, T ) P (E | O, T ) P (O | T ) P (T )
P (H | O, T ) P (O | T ) P (T ) (4.14)
=
P (H | E,O, T ) P (E | O, T )
P (H | O, T ) (4.15)
(O and T) can be removed from P (H | E,O, T ) as they are a child of variable
(E) in the network.
P (E | H,O, T ) = P (H | E) P (E | O, T )
P (H | O, T ) (4.16)
Next step is to get P (E | O, T ) and P (H | O, T ) in equation 4.16 :
P (E,O, T ) = P (E | O, T )P (O, T ) (4.17)
= P (E | O, T )P (O|T )P (T ) (4.18)
Also
P (E,O, T ) = P (O | E, T )P (E, T ) (4.19)
= P (O | E, T )P (E|T )P (T ) (4.20)
Equation’s 4.18 = Equation’s 4.20
P (E,O, T ) = P (E | O, T )P (O|T )P (T ) = P (O | E, T )P (E|T )P (T ) (4.21)
P (E | O, T ) = P (O | E, T )P (E|T )P (T )
P (O|T )P (T ) (4.22)
P (E | O, T ) = P (O | E, T )P (E|T )
P (O|T ) (4.23)
Remove T as T is the child of E in the network
P (E | O, T ) = P (O | E)P (E|T )
P (O|T ) (4.24)
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According to the general equation for conditional probability of:
P (E|T ) = P (E)P (T |E)
P (T )
(4.25)
Also, According to the law of the total probability of:
P (T ) =
∑
i
P (T |Ei)P (Ei) (4.26)
Where i = 0, 12, 3, ..n and n is the number of total probabilities.
Then from equations 4.24, 4.25, and 4.26.
P (E | O, T ) = P (O | E) P (E)P (T |E)
P (O|T ) P (T ) (4.27)
P (E | O, T ) = P (O | E) P (E)P (T |E)
P (O|T ) ∑i [P (T |Ei)P (Ei)] (4.28)
And
P (O|T ) = ∑
i
P (O|Ei) P (Ei|T ) (4.29)
To get P (O, T ), variables (E) is added to the joint probability distribution
P (O, T,E), as (E) comes between them on network.
Then
P (E, T,O) = P (E | T,O)P (T |O)P (O) (4.30)
= P (O | T,E)P (T |E)P (E) (4.31)
= P (T | E,O)P (E|O)P (O) (4.32)
Equation’s 4.30 = Equation’s 4.31 = Equation’s 4.32
P (O | T,E) = P (T | E,O)P (E|O)P (O)
P (T |E)P (E) (4.33)
P (O | T,E) = P (E|O)P (O)
P (E)
(4.34)
P (O) =
∑
i
P (O|Ei) P (Ei) (4.35)
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T is added to both side of equation 4.35.
P (O|T ) = ∑
i
P (O|Ei) P (Ei|T ) (4.36)
From equations 4.28 and 4.29 we get:
P (E | O, T ) = P (O | E) P (E)P (T |E)∑
i [P (O|Ei) P (Ei|T )]
∑
i [P (T |Ei)P (Ei)]
(4.37)
Second we need to getP (H | O, T )
P (H|O, T ) = ∑
i
P (H|Ei) P (Ei|O, T ) (4.38)
P (H|O, T ) = ∑
i
P (E) P (H | Ei)P (O | E) P (T |E)∑
i [P (O|Ei) P (Ei|T )]
∑
i [P (T |Ei)P (Ei)]
(4.39)
Then
P (H | O, T ) = P (O | H) P (H)P (T |H)∑
i [P (O|Ei) P (Ei|T )]
∑
i [P (T |Ei)P (Ei)]
(4.40)
From equation 4.37, and equation 4.39 we can get 4.16.
P (E | H,O, T ) =
P (H | E) P (O|E) P (E)P (T |E)∑
i
[P (O|Ei) P (Ei|T )]
∑
i
[P (T |Ei)P (Ei)]∑
i
P (E) P (H|Ei)P (O|E) P (T |E)∑
i
[P (O|Ei) P (Ei|T )]
∑
i
[P (T |Ei)P (Ei)]
(4.41)
Then
P (E | H,O, T ) = P (E) P (H | E) P (O | E) P (T |E)∑
i [P (Ei) P (H | Ei)P (O | Ei) P (T |Ei)]
(4.42)
Where:P (E) is the probability of insider threat for a certain risk level,P (H | E)
is the probability of the human factor given the probability of insider threat in a
certain risk level, P (O | E) is the probability of the organisational aspect given
the probability of insider threat in a certain risk level, P (T | E) is the probability
of the technology factor given the probability of insider threat in a certain risk
level,
∑
i
[
P (Ei)P (H | Ei)P (O | Ei)P
(
T|Ei
)]
is the sum probabilities for all risk
levels from rare to be insider threat to certainly is an insider threat.
This output P (E | H,O, T ) is the final and main risk level prediction that
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Table 4.1: Mapping the Risk Band to Probability
Rank Risk Band Probability Description
5 Certain Continually experienced insider threats
4 Likely Insider threat breach will occur frequently
3 Possible Insider threat breaches will occur sometimes
2 Unlikely Insider threat incidents will unlikely be expected to occur
1 Rare Almost never authorised user will carry out an insider threat breach, but its possible
computes whether the employee may act as a malicious insider threat or not. We
divided the risk level results into 5 levels based on the amount of harm that can
be expected from each employee, ranging from 1) rare to be insider threat, 2)
unlikely to be an insider threat, 3) a possible insider threat, 4) likely to be
an insider threat, to 5) certainly is an insider threat. (Tab. 4.1) shows the
mapping between the risk band and probability.
4.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have considered the multiple perspective approaches of in-
sider threat detection, by developing a new framework that helps organisations
to predict potential malicious insider threats before a breach takes place. This
framework is based on three dimensions: Human Factor, Organisational Impact,
and Technology Aspect. Each of these dimensions was discussed to present main
key insider threat indicators.
We also introduce the Bayesian Network in order to model the proposed frame-
work. In the next chapter, we will go through the process of data collection and
analysis to run the proposed prediction approach.
Chapter 5
Data collection and Analysis
5.1 Survey Data Collection
In this section we will go through the process of data collection and analysis
to run the proposed prediction approach that helps organisations to discover any
potential malicious or unintentional insider threat from the surveys’ response data
that we gathered from targeted organisations in three steps as below:
5.1.1 Survey Questions (Data Requirements)
Our research is based on quantitative methodology in relation to data collection
by using questioners in the form of surveys. Three surveys were designed based
on three-dimensions of the prediction model (human factor, technology factor,
and organisational aspect) and each survey targeted a specific user group on a
single organisation. The Human Factor surveys Table 5.1 were answered by all
authorised users, the Technology Aspect survey Table 5.2 was answered by the
department responsible for IT, and the Organisational Impact survey Table 5.3
was answered by the department responsible for Human Resources or any top
management staff. Please refer to Appendix A for the full survey questions and
answers options. This survey is based on the use of best strategies to implement
and publish, as follows:
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• We made it clear that the survey should focus on information that is required
to run the proposed model and to fill 93 end node variables of the prediction
model.
• We made the survey easy to answer; a multiple choice questions technique
is used, with the option of a text box to add any extra information. Figure
5.1 shows a snapshot of survey layout.
• A logical flow is created by grouping questions that cover similar topics
together in some places, and a mixed question flow on other places to make
sure the responder’s answers are accurate.
• As not all security breaches are reported to the Human Resource Department
(HR), or are not reported to Information Technology Department (IT), we
have listed 7 questions, which are related to previous security breaches in
the organisational aspect and in the technology factor survey.
• The questions are ordered based on simplicity by making the first questions
easy and interesting in order to engage the respondent and get them into
the flow of the survey.
• We placed personal information at the end of the survey to avoid scaring
people off. We believe that if a responder has taken the time to answer all
related survey questions first, they are more likely to provide at least some
of their personal information at the end.
• An online survey platform https://www.qualtrics.com/ is used to make
the survey easy to reach by the respondents.
• A clear survey introduction was shown before the responder starts answering
questions. Figure 5.2 shows a snapshot of survey introduction.
• The survey was approved to have Ethical Clearance Appendix E.
• The survey was tested by a small group of people before it was published in
order to get feedback regarding layout, overall flow, time spent to complete
it, and the test entries were checked to ensure the answers’ format will fill
93 end node variables.
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Figure 5.1: A Snapshot of the Survey Layout
Figure 5.2: A Snapshot of the Survey Introduction
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Table 5.1: Human Factor Surveys’ Questions
Domain Human Factor Surveys’ Questions
Motive
How old are you?
What is your gender?
Do you understand your organisation’s information security policy?
If work gets difficult, do your colleagues help you?
Do you receive the respect at work you feel you deserve from your colleagues?
Are your colleagues willing to listen to your work-related problems?
Is there friction or anger between colleagues?
Are relationships at work strained?
Do you have sufficient opportunities to question managers about changes at work?
When changes are made at work, are you clear how they will work out in practice?
Can you decide when to take a break?
Do you have a choice in deciding how to do your work?
Do you have some say over the way you work?
Are you given supportive feedback with regard to the work you do?
Can you rely on your line manager to help you out with a work problem?
Can you talk to your line manager about something that has upset or annoyed you
about work?
Are you supported through emotionally demanding work?
Opportunities
How would you best describe your relationship with the organisation?
How long have you been working for this organisation?
How best do you describe your role within the organisation?
How long have you been working in this role?
If you are a current employee, when does your contract expire?
Capabilities
Is it clear what is expected of you at work?
Do you know how to go about getting your job done?
Do you understand how your work fits into the overall aim of the organisation?
Do you have higher work capabilities than your colleagues?
Are you a part of the design or implementation process team?
Do you have access to the organisation’s intellectual property?
Do you feel that the copyright for your own created work is your own intellectual
property and does not belong to your organisation?
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Table 5.2: Technology Aspect Surveys’ Questions
Domain Technology Aspect Surveys’ questions
Investment
How much does your organisation allocate to the IT budget in one year?
How much of the IT budget is spent on IT security?
How much of the IT security budget is spent on protection from insider threats?
Do you have any concerns regarding security threats coming from authorised users?
Does your organisation provide any security awareness and training strategy?
Does your organisation encourage all authorised users to attend security awareness
and training programmes?
How often do your employees attend security awareness and training programmes?
Detection Level
What proportion of false insider alerts are generated by the security system?
In previous security breaches, how did your organisation detect an insider threat?
In previous security breaches, how many insider attacks has your system failed to
detect?
Security and Privacy
Controls
Which of the following IT security tools has your organisation implemented in order
to detect an insider threat?
Which of the following statements best describes how security and privacy controls
are integrated to detect insider threats?
Which of the following statements best describes how the external and insider threat
detection systems are integrated?
Which of the following data are logged on the organisation’s system to help detect
an insider threat?
Related to Organisa-
tion Impact
Has your organisation suffered any information security breach in the last 5 years?
Has your organisation suffered any security breach that was accidently caused by
an authorised user in the last 5 years?
Has your organisation been under attack from external threats?
Has your organisation suffered any security breach caused by an authorised user in
the last 5 years?
If Yes to the previous question, please let us know which type of authorised user
security breach your organisation suffered?
What action was taken against any malicious authorised user?
Has your organisation applied any extra measurement to monitor user activity in
the termination period,?
Table 5.3: Organisational Impact Surveys’ Questions
Domain Organisational Impact Surveys’ questions
Security Breach
Has your organisation suffered any information security breach in the last 5 years?
Has your organisation suffered any security breach that was accidently caused by
an authorised user in the last 5 years?
Has your organisation been under attack from external threats?
Has your organisation suffered any security breach caused by an authorised user in
the last 5 years?
If Yes to the previous question, please let us know which type of authorised user
security breach your organisation suffered?
What action was taken against any malicious authorised user?
Structure
What sector does your organisation belong to?
What is your organisation size in terms of employee numbers?
Does your organisation have its own IT security department?
Does your organisation outsource IT services?
Does your organisation outsource IT security services?
Does your organisation apply criminal records checks for people it employs before
giving them access to IT systems?
Does your organisation recruit people from overseas?
Security Policy
Does your organisation have a written security policy?
How often does your organisation update or review its security policy?
Do all authorised users follow your organisation’s security policy?
Work-related stress
symptoms
Do you recognise any of the following symptoms at work?
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5.1.2 Data Collection
The main objectives of this stage were to collect high-quality raw data from spe-
cific organisations. We conducted our study on two organisations: first in the
education sector, and second in a small enterprise. Both are based in United
Kingdom.
For the education sector, we circulated the human factor survey to 15
heads of department and managers at this organisation, we asked them to forward
the survey link to their department staff. Many of them complied with our request.
For the technology factor survey we conducted two interviews with two IT
Services’ management teams. The first interview was with the Assistant Director
(Infrastructure and Operations), and the second interview was with the Assistant
Director (Service Management and Governance).
For the organisational aspect we conducted our interview with the head of
department for the Computer Science Department.
The number of responses to the human factor survey was 70 authorised users
from this organisation. Also, two responded to the technology factor survey and
one responded to organisational aspect survey, as shown in Table 5.4.
For the small enterprise, we conducted an interview with the company dir-
ector to collect answers regarding the technology factor and organisational aspect.
Also, he forwarded the human factor survey to all his employees and encouraged
them to answer it.
To encourage staff to answer this survey on time, we set a deadline date to
participate. We also asked them to enter their names in the last field of the survey
if they wished to enter in a prize draw. The number of responses to the human
factor survey was 12 authorised users from this organisation. Also, one responded
to the technology factor survey and one responded to organisational aspect survey,
as shown in Table 5.4.
Table 5.4: Respond Values
Human Factor Organisation Aspect Technology Factor
Education Sector 70 1 2
Small Enterprise 12 1 1
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Figure 5.3: Data Processing and Exploitation Method
Table 5.5: Missing Values
Number of Cases Completed Uncompleted Missing all Variables
Education Sector 70 42 27 1
Small Enterprise 13 7 5 1
5.1.3 Data Processing and Exploitation Method
In this phase, we prepare collected survey data by making them compatible with
modelling software and removing any unwanted data from the dataset. To do this,
we created a method that allow us to divide the process into three steps: Data
Organising, Data Processing, and Exploratory data analysis, as described below,
also Figure 5.3 shows a data processing and exploitation process method.
• Data Organising: Data initially obtained must be processed or organised
for analysis. In our case, data processing was the process that was required
to convert collected survey responses into a format compatible with Bayes
Network Software 1 (experimental environment) and compact all collected
raw data onto one database file. In this step, we integrated all human factor
variables of each response with the technology factor and organisation aspect
directly from survey responses to one database file, for each organisation.
• Data Processing: In this phase, we aimed to find any invalid values or
corrupted data. Data cleaning is the process that helps us in detecting,
correcting, or deleting corrupted or inaccurate cases from the database that
we created in the last step.
After we integrated all aspects in the database, we reviewed all the variables
in the data file and we determined their valid values using SPSS software.
For the Education Sector, we found 42 cases were fully completed, 27 cases
1Bayes Server Version 6.17 is a tool for modeling Bayesian networks and Dynamic Bayesian
networks. It is a widely used software in the fields of Machine Learning, Data Science, Artificial
Intelligence, Big data, and Time Series Analysis.
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were missing some variables, and one case was missing all data. Also, the
same steps were carried out for small enterprise and we found that 7 cases
were fully completed, 5 cases were missing some variables, and one case
was missing all data. Table 5.5 summarises the number of completed and
uncompleted responses.
Table 5.6 shows the missing values analysis for the human factor, using SPSS
software for the education sector on the left-hand side and for the Small En-
terprise on the right-hand side.
It is clear that in education sector’s case, most of the variables in the survey
questionnaire were over 90% completed. However, the last three variables
were less than 30% completed. In the small enterprise’s responses most of
the variables are completed, except Contract Expiration and for the last
three variables, less than 10% are uncompleted.
Table 5.6: Missing Values SPPS Analysis
Education Sector Small Enterprise
Responses Missing Responses Missing
Count Percent Count Percent
Age 69 0 0 12 0 0
Gender 69 0 0 12 0 0
Type of Employment 65 4 5.8 12 0 0
Employment period 69 0 0 12 0 0
Position Period 69 0 0 12 0 0
Contract Expiration 64 5 7.2 8 4 33.3
Understanding Security Policy 69 0 0 12 0 0
Colleagues Help 63 6 8.7 12 0 0
Colleagues Respect 63 6 8.7 12 0 0
Colleagues listen to work related problems 63 6 8.7 12 0 0
Anger between colleagues 63 6 8.7 12 0 0
Work strained relationships 63 6 8.7 12 0 0
Change opinion 63 6 8.7 12 0 0
Change practice 63 6 8.7 12 0 0
Own break decision 63 6 8.7 12 0 0
Own decision of how to do the task 63 6 8.7 12 0 0
Way of work opinion 63 6 8.7 12 0 0
Supportive feedback 63 6 8.7 12 0 0
Rely on line manager to help with a work problem 62 7 10.1 12 0 0
Talking to line manager regarding upsetting from work 63 6 8.7 12 0 0
Emotionally support 62 7 10.1 12 0 0
Work knowledge 63 6 8.7 12 0 0
Work experience 63 6 8.7 12 0 0
Work aims 62 7 10.1 12 0 0
Higher work capabilities 62 7 10.1 12 0 0
Design or implementation team 55 14 20.3 11 1 8.3
Intellectual property 54 15 21.7 11 1 8.3
Copyright ownership 49 20 29 11 1 8.3
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• Exploratory data analysis: We created Cross-variable rules, which are
applied to a combination of variables by defining a logical expression that
flags invalid values.
The first rule is to find any response finished in less than 2 minutes, as we
believe that the survey takes more than 2 minutes to complete and the aver-
age time to complete this part of survey is 4 minutes. We found that 4 cases
responded in less than two minutes. We deleted these 4 cases as they are
uncompleted with regard to the education sector, and no cases were found
with regard to small businesses.
To ensure the accuracy for the final risk prediction result a second rule is
created to find out whether there are more than 3 variables missing from
29 variables in the Human Factor survey for each case, as if the case has
more than 3 variables missing this will directly affect the result. Then we
can delete this cases. We found 4 cases matching this rule and we deleted
them with regard to the education sector, and no cases were found relating
to small businesses company.
The third rule is to find any suspicious or invalid cases by looking into some
questions that are related to stress levels and find out whether their values
are equal to each other, for example, if all values are equal to Never. Also,
in this step, we made sure that there was no duplication. Table 5.7 shows
the number of cases that we can use to run our model that results from the
data processing and exploitation phase
Table 5.7: Data Processing and Exploitation Result
Number of Cases
Before Filtering
Completed Un-
der Minutes
More than three
Variables Miss-
ing
Missing all
Human Factor
Variables
Number of Cases
After Filtering
Education Sector 70 4 4 1 61
Small Enterprise 13 0 0 1 12
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5.2 Modeling Prediction Results
The outcome of this prediction aims at helping decision makers to avoid insider
threat breaches by indicating who could be a potential malicious insider threat
within the organisation. Further, we can identify which model domain within
the organisation requires attention from an organisation team to make the right
decisions to improve their defences and mitigate the level of such a threat. In this
section, we will present prediction results for both selected organisations in four
steps, as follows:
5.2.1 Technology Factor Prediction Result
To demonstrate the technology factor prediction results, we have divided it into
four risk levels based on the organisation’s performance and measures of detecting
any potential insider threat. These levels from high to low risk levels are:
• Extreme performance and focus on insider threat.
• High performance and focus on insider threat.
• Moderate performance and low focus on insider threat.
• Low performance and no focus on insider threat.
For the education sector, the proposed model predicted that this organisation is
“ a moderate performance and low focus on insider threat ” organisation in relation
to the detecting and controlling of insider threat incidents. That is because of the
effect of 30 end node variables that we imported from the survey questions related
to this organisation. Table 5.8 shows the state of each of main indicators and
the main reason why this model predicts this level. Also, Figure 5.4 shows case
number 25 Technology Factor level with all end node variables.
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Table 5.8: Technology Factor Predictions
Indicator State Reason
Education Sector
Investment Low
IT security budget for Insider Threat is less than 5%.
No concerns regarding Insider Threat from top manage-
ment.
No security awareness and training is provided.
Detection Level High
Over 90% of insider alert are true.
All insider breach was detected.
Security and pri-
vacy controls
Medium
They keep record of (Network traffic, online activity,
Emails, etc.).
They take an extra measure on the employee termina-
tion period.
Using (SIEM, IDS, ACL, Proxy Server, etc.)
No Security & Privacy controls integration to detect In-
sider
Small Enterprise
Investment Low
IT security budget for Insider Threat is less than 5%.
No concerns regarding Insider Threat from top manage-
ment.
No security awareness and training is provided.
Detection Level Low
No insider threat detection method is found.
Two ends nod are not entered.
Security and pri-
vacy controls
Medium
They keep record of (Emails).
They take an extra measure on the employee termina-
tion period.
Using (ACL only)
No Security & Privacy controls integration to detect In-
sider
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5.2.2 Organisational Aspect Prediction Result
To determine organisational aspect prediction results, we have divided it into three
risk levels, based on the organisational environment and culture that affects the
risk level of insider threat. These levels from low- to high-risk levels are:
• Non-fertile environmental culture for insider threat.
• Neutral culture.
• Moderate performance and low focus on insider threat.
• Fertile environmental culture for insider threat.
For the education sector, neutral culture is predicted for this organisation.
Table 5.9 shows indicators’ states and the reason for this prediction level. Also,
Figure 5.5 shows case number 25 organisational aspect level with all end node
variables For the small enterprise, there are mixed prediction levels for this aspect,
as it predicts that 54% of this organisation is a neutral culture and also predicts
that 43% is a non-fertile environmental culture for insider threat. Table 5.9 shows
indicators’ states and the reason for this prediction level
Table 5.9: Organisational Aspect Prediction
Indicator State Reason
Education Sector
Security Breach Medium
No Authorised user breach in last 5 years of any type.
There is one or more accidental authorised user breach
in last 5 years.
No action was taken when insider security breach is
taken place.
Structure Medium
No pre-employment checks.
Outsource some of IT services.
Security Policy Medium
No enforcement system.
Update or review every 5 years.
Employees
Work-related
Stress Symp-
toms
Medium Some indicators indicate (low morale, increase in long-
term illness, high turnover, etc.)
Small Enterprise
Security Breach Medium
Authorised user breach in last 5 years.
Intellectual property insider breach.
An action is taken when the breach takes a place
Structure Medium
No pre-employment checks.
Outsource IT services.
Security Policy Low No security policy
Employees
Work-related
Stress Symp-
toms
Low Just one indicator indicates (deadlines not being
reached)
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5.2.3 Human Factor Prediction Result
There are five prediction levels for the human factor that are based on personal
characteristics of each employee to be a potential insider threat. These levels are
listed from very high to very low risk levels. Figure 5.6 shows a snapshot for all
human factor node variables. In this factor, as we explained earlier, we consider
all of the organisation’s employees, and each employee has his own case number.
For the education sector, Table 5.10 illustrates the human factor result for all
cases that we have imported from the filtered survey data. The case number is the
unique ID for each survey participant, the human factor prediction is what the
proposed model is predicted, and finally prediction probability is the prediction
percentage of this prediction level. We can see from this table result, 5 cases are
indicated as high in human factor levels, also just 4 cases are indicated as low
levels, and all the rest are indicated as medium levels of human factor.
Table 5.10: Human Factor Result For All Cases
Case Human Factors
Prediction
Predict Probability
of Human Factors
Case Human Factors
Prediction
Predict Probability
of Human Factors
0 Medium 72.57% 33 Medium 80.14%
1 High 60.84% 34 Medium 74.37%
2 High 59.97% 35 Medium 78.48%
3 Medium 72.25% 36 Medium 82.74%
4 High 47.18% 37 Medium 69.41%
5 High 63.80% 38 Medium 65.10%
6 Medium 91.33% 39 Medium 68.23%
7 Medium 71.67% 40 Medium 58.16%
9 Medium 74.19% 41 Medium 77.11%
11 Medium 80.32% 42 Medium 75.05%
12 Medium 85.36% 43 Medium 73.48%
13 Medium 77.99% 44 Medium 74.72%
14 Medium 75.53% 45 Medium 59.59%
15 Medium 86.10% 46 Medium 87.41%
16 Low 52.30% 47 Medium 86.13%
17 Medium 66.99% 48 Medium 87.61%
18 Medium 76.12% 49 Medium 80.37%
19 Medium 66.97% 50 High 44.40%
20 Medium 70.40% 51 Medium 62.21%
21 Medium 81.12% 52 Medium 84.66%
22 Medium 83.39% 53 Medium 81.31%
23 Medium 83.58% 55 Medium 75.38%
24 Medium 67.41% 56 Low 70.18%
25 Medium 60.51% 57 Medium 69.20%
26 Medium 80.63% 58 Medium 66.96%
27 Medium 83.29% 62 Medium 65.73%
28 Medium 62.99% 63 Medium 69.70%
29 Medium 72.33% 64 Low 52.78%
30 Low 62.55% 65 Medium 81.48%
31 Medium 77.27% 69 Medium 74.32%
32 Medium 76.31%
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Table 5.11: Case 4 and Case 22 of the Human Factor Results
Case number Indicator State Reason
4
Motive High
Do not understanding security policy.
Work-related Stress Level is high.
Opportunity Medium
Position period is between one and three years.
Contract expiration is over one year.
Capability High Copyright ownership.
22
Motive Medium
Understanding security policy.
Never get emotional support.
Sometime anger between colleagues.
Opportunity Low
Position period is less than a year.
Contract expiration is over one year.
Capability Medium No access to Intellectual property.
Table 5.12: Human Factor Result for All 12 Cases
Case Human Factors Predict Predict Probability of Human Factors
0 Medium 74.260 %
1 Medium 80.351 %
2 Medium 69.101 %
3 High 69.742 %
4 Medium 71.804 %
5 Medium 54.965 %
6 Medium 68.281 %
7 Medium 74.057 %
8 Medium 75.616 %
9 Medium 54.130 %
10 Medium 73.022 %
11 High 62.237 %
In order to gain a better understanding, we have selected two different cases
in this thesis, case number 4 and case number 22 “ please refer to Appendix F
and Appendix G for full Bayes network digram. Case 4 is predicted with a high
level and that is due to three main indicator variables: high motivation, medium
opportunities with high capability. Also, case 22 is predicted as medium level and
that is because the participant has medium motivation to enact malicious insider
threat, and low opportunities with medium capability. Table 5.11 shows case 4
and case 22 of the human factor results.
For small enterprise, Table 5.12 illustrates the human factor result for all 12
cases that we imported from the filtered survey data. It is clear that only two cases
are predicted to be high levels for the human factor and the others are medium
levels. Therefore, it will affect the overall insider threat prediction in the next
step.
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5.2.4 Insider Threat Prediction Results
This output is the final and main risk level prediction that predicts whether the
employee may enact any malicious insider threat or not. We have divided the risk
levels result into 5 levels, from rare to be insider threat to a certain is an insider
threat, as Figure 5.7 shows a snap-shot for Insider Threat Risk Prediction Levels,
which is based on the amount of harm that can be expected from each employee.
These levels from low to high risk levels are:
• Rare to be insider threat.
• Unlikely to be insider threat
• Possible insider threat.
• Likely to be insider threat.
• Certain is insider threat.
Figure 5.7: A Snapshot for Insider Threat Risk Prediction Levels
For the education sector, Table 5.13 illustrates the final result from the pro-
posed prediction model. The first column displays case numbers ranging from 0
to 69 with some missing cases, as we deleted them during the data processing and
exploitation phase. The second column displays the predicted risk level that has
the highest prediction probability percentage. And the last five columns display
the percentages of prediction probabilities for all risk levels.
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Table 5.13: Insider Threat Prediction Result
Case Insider Threat Risk Predictions
Predict Probability
Rare Unlikely Possible Likely Certain
0 Unlikely insider threat 0.045 46.735 43.063 8.658 1.5
1 Possible insider threat 0.002 22.413 55.65 15.185 6.749
2 Possible insider threat 0.006 22.827 55.391 15.035 6.741
3 Unlikely insider threat 1.073 64.519 29.71 4.337 0.362
4 Possible insider threat 0.058 30.845 50.985 12.763 5.349
5 Possible insider threat 0.002 22.002 56.129 15.642 6.226
6 Unlikely insider threat 0.065 56.489 37.591 5.548 0.307
7 Unlikely insider threat 0.224 50.234 40.112 7.551 1.879
9 Unlikely insider threat 0.063 47.832 42.347 8.271 1.487
11 Unlikely insider threat 0.689 62.232 32.243 4.601 0.234
12 Unlikely insider threat 0.073 53.591 39.193 6.506 0.637
13 Unlikely insider threat 0.753 64.699 30.251 4.104 0.193
14 Unlikely insider threat 0.029 47.712 42.627 8.318 1.314
15 Unlikely insider threat 0.268 58.061 35.924 5.374 0.373
16 Unlikely insider threat 3.232 77.647 16.824 2.228 0.07
17 Possible insider threat 0.042 43.694 44.454 9.25 2.56
18 Unlikely insider threat 0.641 59.312 33.964 5.415 0.668
19 Unlikely insider threat 0.971 59.599 32.734 5.6 1.096
20 Unlikely insider threat 0.027 45.11 44.004 9.075 1.784
21 Unlikely insider threat 0.17 53.56 38.746 6.606 0.918
22 Unlikely insider threat 0.288 57.307 36.226 5.657 0.522
23 Unlikely insider threat 0.194 55.261 37.747 6.131 0.667
24 Unlikely insider threat 1.336 64.888 28.887 4.414 0.475
25 Unlikely insider threat 2.081 70.867 23.664 3.262 0.126
26 Unlikely insider threat 0.489 59.523 34.299 5.226 0.462
27 Unlikely insider threat 0.361 59.774 34.413 5.07 0.382
28 Unlikely insider threat 1.799 71.042 23.92 3.159 0.08
29 Unlikely insider threat 0.034 46.253 43.363 8.749 1.601
30 Unlikely insider threat 4.34 81.464 12.547 1.625 0.024
31 Unlikely insider threat 0.112 50.681 40.39 7.306 1.512
32 Unlikely insider threat 0.885 62.853 31.357 4.601 0.304
33 Unlikely insider threat 0.256 54.94 37.6 6.279 0.924
34 Unlikely insider threat 0.042 47.271 42.668 8.281 1.738
35 Unlikely insider threat 0.338 55.637 36.9 6.153 0.972
36 Unlikely insider threat 0.075 52.253 39.918 6.913 0.84
37 Unlikely insider threat 0.081 45.937 43.182 8.786 2.014
38 Unlikely insider threat 1.568 67.691 26.59 3.854 0.296
39 Unlikely insider threat 0.974 60.046 32.549 5.478 0.953
40 Possible insider threat 0.239 42.184 44.589 9.834 3.154
41 Unlikely insider threat 0.16 51.284 40.09 7.353 1.113
42 Unlikely insider threat 0.466 56.271 36.088 6.127 1.047
43 Unlikely insider threat 0.247 51.341 39.536 7.3 1.577
44 Unlikely insider threat 0.015 47.019 43.034 8.484 1.448
45 Unlikely insider threat 1.6 64.963 27.995 4.641 0.801
46 Unlikely insider threat 0.209 57.431 36.52 5.478 0.364
47 Unlikely insider threat 0.352 60.911 33.863 4.712 0.162
48 Unlikely insider threat 0.289 60.217 34.487 4.79 0.216
49 Unlikely insider threat 0.733 64.984 30.266 3.954 0.063
50 Possible insider threat 0.078 29.99 50.761 12.362 6.808
51 Possible insider threat 0.155 43.547 43.979 9.334 2.986
52 Unlikely insider threat 0.389 59.717 34.565 5.042 0.287
53 Unlikely insider threat 0.71 64.625 30.61 4 0.055
55 Unlikely insider threat 1.017 64.729 29.873 4.191 0.19
56 Unlikely insider threat 5.212 84.151 9.411 1.212 0.013
57 Unlikely insider threat 1.267 65.628 28.583 4.213 0.31
58 Unlikely insider threat 1.358 65.805 28.209 4.242 0.387
62 Unlikely insider threat 1.425 66.886 27.264 3.994 0.431
63 Unlikely insider threat 0.016 44.612 44.237 9.145 1.99
64 Unlikely insider threat 3.322 77.805 16.608 2.196 0.068
65 Unlikely insider threat 0.117 52.655 39.478 6.837 0.913
69 Unlikely insider threat 0.273 52.375 38.871 7.04 1.44
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Figure 5.8: Insider Threat Prediction Result
By converting the previous table’s results into the line chart on Figure 5.8, we
can analyse and understand the result by looking into the lines to discover any
high-risk levels or abnormal behaviour. From the previous table, it is clear that
there are 8 cases (1, 2, 4, 5, 17, 40, 50, and 51)that are predicted to be a possible
insider threat, and the rest of the cases that are predicted as unlikely to be an
insider threat.
However, if we analyse the line chart, we can conclude that there are some
cases that are on the borderline between “ possibly being an insider threat ” and
“unlikely to be an insider threat”, and we need to take them into our considera-
tions. Next, we will explain two cases with different levels, and one case with two
narrow prediction levels.
Please note that the result values are affected by the technology factor and
organisational aspect as well. However, the organisational aspect and technology
factor are the same values for all cases within the same organisation. For this
reason, we will not mention these two in all cases. We will instead solely focus on
the human factor.
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Table 5.14: Case 4 Human Factors
Indicator State Reason
Motive High
Do not understanding security policy.
Work-related Stress Level is high, because of:
No support from colleagues and mangers.
Change management resistant.
Anger relationship between colleagues.
Opportunity Medium
Position period is between one and three years.
Contract expiration is over one year.
Capability High
Copyright ownership.
Access to organisation Intellectual Property.
Part of design or implementation teams.
Higher work capability than his colleagues.
Table 5.15: Case 22 Human Factors
Indicator State Reason
Motive Medium
Understanding security policy.
Never get emotional support.
Sometime anger between colleagues.
Opportunity Low
Position period is less than a year.
Contract expiration is over one year.
Capability Medium No access to Intellectual property.
Case Number 04 Our model predicts that this case is more than 50% as a
possible an insider threat with 12% as likely to be an insider threat. To understand
why this model predicts these values we need to go through this survey response
regarding the human factor. It is clear that the human factor levels are predicted
as high levels, and this is affected by a high capability level, medium opportunity
level, and high motivation level. Table 5.14 and Appendix B shows the reasons
behind these values.
Case Number 22 In this case, our model predicted that this case is 55%
unlikely to be an insider threat. The reason behind this prediction is that the
human factor levels are predicted as 83% at medium level, and this is affected by
a medium capability level, low opportunity level, and medium motivation level.
Table 5.15 and Appendix B shows the reason behind these values.
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Table 5.16: Insider Threat Prediction Result for the Small Enterprise
Case Insider Threat Risk Predictions
Predict Probability %
Rare Unlikely Possible Likely Certain
0 Unlikely insider threat 0.02 52.883 29.936 15.633 1.529
1 Unlikely insider threat 0.016 54.411 30.264 14.539 0.77
2 Unlikely insider threat 0.029 54.617 28.459 15.219 1.676
3 Likely insider threat 0 10.141 36.459 36.617 16.783
4 Unlikely insider threat 0.001 37.297 35.929 23.174 3.599
5 Possible insider threat 0.003 31.128 35.274 25.818 7.778
6 Unlikely insider threat 0.01 42.091 33.182 20.556 4.16
7 Unlikely insider threat 0.018 52.761 29.99 15.787 1.445
8 Unlikely insider threat 0.021 52.699 30.302 15.827 1.151
9 Unlikely insider threat 0.011 36.441 33.017 23.464 7.067
10 Unlikely insider threat 0.024 54.989 28.891 14.735 1.361
11 Possible insider threat 0 12.804 36.025 34.23 16.94
Case Number 20 As we can see from the previous line chart for case 20, two
lines are very narrow. The model predicts that 45% is unlikely to be an insider
threat and 44% is a possible insider threat with just 1% difference. For this bor-
derline type of case, a security analysis team should step in to analyse it manually
and decide which risk level they will approve. In this case, the employee is between
25 and 45 years old, she does not understand security policies. She has access to
the organisation’s intellectual property and believes that she owns the copyright
ownerships. On the other hand, her motivation level is a normal level. From this
information, the security team can know the point at which to carry out analysis
on her case to avoid any unintentional insider threat in the future. Giving her
security awareness training will affect her insider risk levels in future assessments,
as she then will understand the organisation’s security policy and copyright own-
ership.
From 12 cases in this small enterprise, our prediction model predicted that 1
case is likely to be an insider threat, 2 cases were predicted as possible insider
threats, and 9 cases were predicted as unlikely to be insider threats. Table 5.16
shows the final result from the proposed prediction model.
By converting the above table result into the line chart in Figure 5.9, we can
analyse and understand the result by looking into the lines to discover any high-
risk levels or abnormal behaviour. Next, we will explain three cases with different
levels.
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Table 5.17: Case 11 Human Factors
Indicator State Reason
Motive High
Do not understanding security policy.
Work-related Stress Level is high, because of:
Negative peer support from colleagues and mangers.
Negative way of work control
Anger relationship between colleagues.
Opportunity Medium
Position period is less than one year.
Contract expiration is less than one year.
Capability High
Copyright ownership.
Access to organisation Intellectual Property.
Part of design or implementation teams.
Higher work experience and capability than his colleagues.
Figure 5.9: Insider Threat Prediction Result Line Chart
Case Number 11 Our model predicts that this case is to 36% a possible an
insider threat with 34% likely to be insider threat and with more than 16% being
certainly an insider threat. To understand why this model predicts these values,
we need to go through the authorised user survey response values regarding the
human factor. It is clear that human factor levels are predicted as high levels, and
this is affected by a high capability level, a medium opportunity level, and high
motivation levels, Table 5.17 shows the reason behind these values.
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Table 5.18: Case 0 Human Factors
Indicator State Reason
Motive Medium
Do not understanding security policy.
Work-related Stress Level is low, because of:
Positive peer support from colleagues and mangers.
Positive way of work control
Positive relationship between colleagues.
Opportunity Medium
Position period is less than a year.
Contract expiration is less than one year.
Capability Medium
Access to organisation Intellectual Property.
Copyright ownerships belong to organisation.
Not part of design or implementation teams.
Higher work experience and capability than his colleagues.
Case Number 0 In this case, our model predicts that over 52% is unlikely
to be an insider threat. The reason behind this prediction is the human factor
levels, which are predicted to be 73% at the medium level, and this is affected by
a medium capability level, a medium opportunity level, and medium motivation
levels. Table 5.18 shows the reason behind these values.
Case Number 3 In this case, the model predicts that case 3 is likely to be
an insider threat due to one missing value regarding the contract expiration date.
Because the participant has not completed this question, our model assumes a
threat in this case, as the contract will expire in less than three months. Other
reasons are regarding work related-stress levels.
5.3 Agreement with Theory
Bayes network software was used as the experimental environment to implement
the insider threat prediction model in this chapter, the risk levels output formula
was created in section 4.3.3. In this section, we will calculate the risk levels using
the equation (Eq. 4.42) and applied to a small sample from the proposed network,
to approve that we will get the same result if we calculate it manually.
Example 1 By using the experimental environment, (Fig. 5.10) shows the result
of 64.29 % is probability prediction for emergency insider threat risk prediction
(E) to be possible insider threat where human factor (H) is high, organisational
aspect (O) is natural culture, and technology factor (T) is moderate performance
and low focus on insider threat.
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Figure 5.10: Bayes Network Example 1
Figure 5.11: Prior Probabilities
As we have set on the design phase the prior probabilities for the H is high and
E is possible to be 60%, the prior probabilities for the O is natural culture and E
is possible is 80%, the prior probabilities for the T is moderate performance and
low focus on insider threat and E is possible is 30%, and prior probabilities to be
possible insider threat is 20%, as shown on (Fig. 5.11) .
Apply these numbers to the equation 4.42 we will get the same result as the
experimental environment, which which proof that the result from (Fig. 5.10) is
equal to result using (Eq. 4.42), as below:
P(E | H,O, T ) = 20∗60∗80∗30
(20∗0∗20∗0)+(20∗20∗60∗20)+(20∗60∗80∗30)+(20∗80∗20∗30)+(20∗20∗20∗20)
P (E | H,O, T ) = 64.2857%
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Figure 5.12: Bayes Network Example 2
Example 2 By using the experimental environment, (Fig. 5.12) shows the res-
ult of 57.14 % is probability prediction for emergency insider threat risk prediction
(E) to be a rare insider threat where human factor (H) is low, organisational as-
pect (O) is non fertile environmental culture for insider threat, and technology
factor (T) is high performance and focus on insider threat.
As we have set on the design phase the prior probabilities for the H is low and
E is rare to be 20%, the prior probabilities for the O is non fertile environmental
culture and E is rare is 80%, the prior probabilities for the T is high performance
and focus on insider threat and E is rare is 20%, and prior probabilities to be
possible insider threat is 20%, as shown on (Fig. 5.11) .
Apply these numbers to the equation 4.42 we will get the same result as the
experimental environment, which proof that the result from (Fig. 5.12) is equal to
result using (Eq. 4.42), as below:
P(E | H,O, T ) = 20∗20∗80∗20
(20∗20∗80∗20)+(20∗20∗30∗40)+(20∗0∗10∗20)+(20∗0∗10∗10)+(20∗0∗0∗10)
P (E | H,O, T ) = 57.1428%
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5.4 Summary
In this chapter, we have implemented the proposed model based on the process
of data collection. A survey was conducted and data was collected from a single
organisation. Then a risk level and the prediction for each authorised user within
the organisation were analysed and measured via Bayesian Network Software. The
outcome from this prediction can help decision-makers by indicating who could be
a potential malicious insider within the organisation so as to make proactive de-
cisions and to avoid insider threat breaches happening. Please refer to Appendix
B for the full list of all variables with changing of the probability for the selected
cases 4, 20, 22, 69
In the next chapter, the validation of the prediction model will be carried out
by comparing the model prediction results in Table 5.13 with the expert judgments
r that we collected via a workshop.
Chapter 6
Validation of the Prediction
Model
6.1 Introduction
Insider threat prediction model provides facilities that support organisational de-
cision makers to predict the risk of insider threat for each authorised user. How-
ever, before we can use this tool in practices, some steps should be carried out to
evaluated the prediction model to ensure its validity.
Verification and validation (V&V) are the means by which the model is checked
in each step in development stages, and by which its performance is demonstrated
and assured to be a correct interpretation of the requirements. In short, validation
means “ are we building the right product? ” [12] where verification means “ are
we building the product right? ” [22] However, model validity is the process of
increasing confidence in a model, and not one of demonstrating absolute accuracy
[76].
The main aim of V&V is to ensure that the model is suitable for a particular
use and increasing confidence in a model, by not being able to prove its invalidity,
to the point that it will be used for decision-making [77].
80
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Figure 6.1: Simulation Model Verification and Validation in a Simulation Study
6.2 Concepts of Verification and Validation
Robinson [5] adapted a new framework of the life cycle for model development and
use, illustrated on Figure 6.1, this model framework is based on V&V on each
key activities. These V&V activities are defined by Robinson [5] for each process
as follows:
• Conceptual Model Validation: define that the proposed model scope and
level of detail are sufficient for the aim at hand.
• Data Validation: defining that the required data for model is sufficiently
accurate .
• Verification: the method of ensuring that the conceptual model has been
transformed into a computer model with sufficient accuracy.
• White-box Validation: defining that the essential parts of the computer sim-
ulations represent the corresponding real-world elements, with satisfactory
accuracy.
• Black-box Validation: defining that the overall model represents the real
world with sufficient accuracy.
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• Experimentation Validation: determining that the experimental procedures
adopted are providing results that are sufficiently accurate.
• Solution Validation: determining that the results obtained from the model
of the proposed solution are sufficiently accurate.
6.3 Verification of the Insider Threat
Prediction Approach
To ensure our approach is valid, we made sure from day one to take all the right
steps and actions by verifying most of steps we take to implement the proposed
model.
First, we asked ourselves if we are building the model, right? Is the project
scope reflected to our aims? Do we carry out regular reviews, meetings and in-
spections? Is the required data for the proposed model sufficiently accurate? Did
we make all the transformation from the proposed framework to a model without
missing any part and correct? And where did model output reflect to what we
have expected?
If we found the answer is “No” of any of the previous questions, then we take
all the steps to make it right and start the verification procedure from where it
failed.
An example of this verification process where the answer where “No” to the
question “Is the required data for the proposed model sufficiently accurate?”.
In chapter 5, after collecting the survey questions answers, we found that some
responses values are invalid. The step we carried out at that time to make the
data input valid, is by applying cross-variable rules for all responses values. One
of these rules were if the survey finished in less than 2 minutes, this would indicate
that the participant does not take it seriously, we found 4 cases match this rule,
these cases were deleted from the database, and a verification process started again
by using the next rule.
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6.4 Validation of the Prediction Model
The main challenge for the model validation is the need to compare the predic-
tion result against real insider threat events. Due to the nature of this problem,
however, real insider threat events are rarely published. However, Greitzer et
al. validated their approach described in the previous chapters by comparing 24
case results with two HR experts judgments, giving a result correlation of R2 1 =
0.598.[40]
We adopt a similar approach that Greitzer et al [40] used in our validation
method, by comparing the results of the model prediction with the empirical
judgements made by five researchers in the field of cyber-security, we refer to
them in this report as a “security experts”.
Firstly, a validation workshop has been organised by us to validate the pro-
posed prediction model result. Five security experts attended this meeting. We
started the workshop by presenting the background of insider threat breaches
within the organisations, followed by a brief discussion of the proposed prediction
framework, model, and its results.
A validation feedback form was provided to all experts´ participants, please
refer to Appendix D for the feedback form. We then started describing the data
collected in chapter 5 directly from the database file in a case by case procedure
to all security experts.
They used a ranking probability election method 2to rank risk level from 1 to
5 for each case, where a rank of 1 signifies the most expected prediction (Certain),
and a rank of 5 signifies the least expected prediction (Rare). Please refer to Ap-
pendix D for the expert participants contribution feedback forms at the validation
workshop.
1R2 In statistic, R-squared is to calculate how close the data are to the fitted regression-line.
As well its known as the coefficient of multiple determination for multiple regression.
2Probability Election Method A method for protocols are used to assess and incorporate
subjective probabilities in risk and decision analysis. various probability elicitation methods
commonly used in risk analysis such as RR (Rank reciprocal), EW(Equal weight), RS(Rank
Sum), ROC(Rank order centroid)
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Figure 6.2: Verification Test
Barron and Barret in their research concluded that Rank order centroid (ROC)
3 weights are more accurate than the other rank-based formulae [3]. The ROC
ranking- based method is used to calculate the weight of the probabilities of each
risk level based on the selected values from the experts’ judgments , (Tab. 6.1)
illustrated the calculation result for ROC of Insider Threat Experts Judgement.
The ROC formula used in this phase described as below:
wti =
(
1
n
) n∑
k=i
(
1
k
)
(6.1)
Where wti is the weight of each ranked order value, n is the total number of
objectives and i = 1, ... ., n & {wt1 ≥ wt2 ≥ ..... ≥ wtn}.
The model risk results were verified by examining the extent to which the
model’s results agreed with the experts’ judgments, based on the results in Table
5.13 and Table 6.1.
Figure 6.2 shows the results of this verification test in respect to 61 cases
from the selected organisation. The resulting correlation was generally around
R2 = 0.87, which indicates an acceptable fit in this area of research [40].
3 Rank order centroid In statistic, based on this the ”ROC” weight method produces an
estimate of the weights that minimises the maximum error of each weight by identifying the
centroid of all possible weights maintaining the rank order of objective importance[32].
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Table 6.1: Insider Threat Experts Judgement Result
Case Insider Threat Risk Predictions
Predict Probability
Rare Unlikely Possible Likely Certain
0 Unlikely insider threat 5.25 37.6 33.6 15.6 8
1 Possible insider threat 4 21.6 45.6 19.6 9
2 Possible insider threat 4 21.6 37.6 27.6 8
3 Unlikely insider threat 6.5 33.6 31.6 21.6 7
4 Possible insider threat 6.5 19.6 41.6 25.6 7
5 Unlikely insider threat 5.25 37.6 33.6 15.6 8
6 Unlikely insider threat 5.25 45.6 25.6 15.6 7
7 Possible insider threat 5.25 29.6 41.6 15.6 7
9 Unlikely insider threat 6.5 41.6 29.6 15.6 6
11 Unlikely insider threat 6.5 45.6 25.6 15.6 7
12 Unlikely insider threat 6.5 45.6 25.6 15.6 7
13 Unlikely insider threat 7.75 41.6 29.6 15.6 6
14 Unlikely insider threat 7.75 41.6 29.6 15.6 6
15 Unlikely insider threat 7.75 45.6 25.6 15.6 6
16 Unlikely insider threat 7.75 45.6 25.6 15.6 6
17 Possible insider threat 6.5 25.6 45.6 15.6 7
18 Possible insider threat 5.25 33.6 37.6 15.6 8
19 Possible insider threat 5.25 25.6 37.6 23.6 8
20 Possible insider threat 7.75 29.6 41.6 15.6 6
21 Unlikely insider threat 6.5 45.6 25.6 15.6 6
22 Unlikely insider threat 7.75 45.6 25.6 15.6 6
23 Unlikely insider threat 9 45.6 25.6 15.6 4
24 Unlikely insider threat 9 45.6 25.6 15.6 4
25 Unlikely insider threat 9 45.6 25.6 15.6 4
26 Unlikely insider threat 9 45.6 25.6 14.28 4
27 Unlikely insider threat 9 45.6 25.6 14.28 4
28 Unlikely insider threat 9 45.6 25.6 15.6 5
29 Unlikely insider threat 9 45.6 22.28 15.6 4
30 Unlikely insider threat 9 45.6 25.6 15.6 4
31 Unlikely insider threat 9 45.6 25.6 15.6 4
32 Unlikely insider threat 9 45.6 25.6 15.6 4
33 Unlikely insider threat 9 45.6 25.6 15.6 4
34 Unlikely insider threat 9 45.6 25.6 15.6 4
35 Unlikely insider threat 7.75 37.6 33.6 15.6 6
36 Unlikely insider threat 9 45.6 25.6 15.6 4
37 Unlikely insider threat 9 45.6 25.6 14.28 4
38 Unlikely insider threat 9 45.6 25.6 15.6 4
39 Unlikelyinsider threat 9 45.6 25.6 15.6 4
40 Possible insider threat 5.25 23.6 45.6 17.6 8
41 Unlikely insider threat 7.75 45.6 25.6 15.6 5
42 Unlikely insider threat 7.75 45.6 25.6 15.6 5
43 Unlikely insider threat 7.75 45.6 25.6 15.6 5
44 Unlikely insider threat 7.75 45.6 25.6 15.6 5
45 Unlikely insider threat 7.75 45.6 25.6 15.6 5
46 Unlikely insider threat 7.75 45.6 25.6 15.6 5
47 Unlikely insider threat 7.75 45.6 25.6 15.6 5
48 Unlikely insider threat 7.75 45.6 25.6 15.6 5
49 Unlikely insider threat 7.75 45.6 25.6 15.6 5
50 Unlikely insider threat 7.75 45.6 25.6 15.6 5
51 Unlikely insider threat 7.75 45.6 29.6 15.6 5
52 Unlikely insider threat 7.75 45.6 25.6 15.6 5
53 Unlikely insider threat 7.75 45.6 25.6 15.6 5
55 Unlikely insider threat 7.75 45.6 25.6 15.6 5
56 Unlikely insider threat 7.75 45.6 25.6 15.6 5
57 Unlikely insider threat 7.75 45.6 25.6 15.6 5
58 Unlikely insider threat 7.75 45.6 25.6 15.6 5
62 Unlikely insider threat 6.5 37.6 33.6 15.6 6
63 Unlikely insider threat 7.75 45.6 25.6 15.6 5
64 Unlikely insider threat 7.75 45.6 25.6 15.6 5
65 Unlikely insider threat 7.75 45.6 25.6 15.6 5
69 Unlikely insider threat 7.75 41.6 29.6 15.6 5
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6.5 Summary
This chapter described the important steps to verify and validate the insider threat
prediction model result, to get enough confidence of the result. We evaluate the
prediction results by comparing the model result with security expert’s judgements
results, by using different statistic methods to find how close the data are to the
fitted regression line. In addition, the verification process has been carried out in
each model development stage.
In the next chapter a dynamic model approach to mitigate the insider threat
will be propose to try to improve the result of the validated static model over the
time.
Chapter 7
A Dynamic Model Approach for
Insider Threats
7.1 Introduction
Risk analysis strategies based on an assessment over an extended time period can
help organisations to mitigate the risk of security breaches [33]. The previous
chapters ( chapter 4 and chapter 5 ) in this thesis have presented a novel approach
to predict the risk levels of insider threat based on a single period of data collec-
tion within an organisation, were described as a static model. In this part, we
propose a new method to predict insider threats over a period of time, based on
data collected and analysed on different time scales, called a dynamic model.
7.2 Model Formulation
Static Bayesian networks described in chapter 4 can be extended with the concept
of a time series - known as a Dynamic Bayesian network (DBN) [23]. DBNs model
probability distributions over series of random variables of Z = {Z1, Z2, . . . .}
where variables can be divided into Zt = ( Xt, Ut, Yt) to represent all observed
variables (input, hidden and output) in a state-space model.
This means that DBNs can model time series or sequences; indeed they can
model complex multivariate time series, thus encompassing the relationships between
multiple time series within the same model [80].
Dynamic Bayesian networks are represented as a pair ( B1, B→), where B1
is a Bayesian network, which defines the prior P (Z1), while the second member
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of the pair (B→) is called a two-slice temporal Bayesian network (2TBN), which
is represented as P (Zt|Zt−1), with the use of Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) as
follows [54] [62]:
P (Z) = P (Z1, Z2, . . .Zt) = P (Zt|Zt−1, Zt−2, . . .Z1) P (Z2|Z1)P (Z1) (7.1)
If we use the representation of P (Zt|Zt−1) we get:
P (Zt |Zt−1) =
N∏
i=1
P (Zit |Parents(Zit)) (7.2)
Then:
P (Z1:T ) =
T∏
t=1
N∏
i=1
P (Zit |Parents(Zit)) (7.3)
Where Zit is the i
th node at time t, and Parents(Zit) from i = 1 to N are the
parents of Zit in the DAG
7.3 The Architecture of Dynamic Insider
Threat Prediction
The aim of this chapter is to provide a prediction method to support organisa-
tional decision makers to analyse the current situation and to establish long-term
strategies to mitigate insider threats. This is based on the previous framework
proposed in chapter 4, which addresses the insider threat problem from three
dimensions: the Technology Aspect Dimension, the Organisational Impact Di-
mension, and the Human Factors Dimension.
The novel aspect of the model development in this chapter is that it addresses
insider threat issues from a fourth dimension, by adding a time series factor to the
previous framework. A new architecture was therefore developed in this chapter
to help organisations to predict potential malicious insider threats in the near
future. (Fig. 7.1) shows the proposed architecture of the Dynamic Insider Threat
Prediction Model, which is divided into four stages as follows:
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Figure 7.1: Architecture of the Dynamic Insider threat Prediction
7.3.1 Data Input
The first phase of this model is the data input phase where data should be collected
from a single organisation over a period of time, to represent the Technology
aspect, Organisational impact, Human factors and time frame. An online survey
method is used to gather this information from a single organisation described in
chapter 5. The collected data then should be sorted into one database file.
7.3.2 Data Analysis
In this stage, the data collected in phase one will be filtered by various rules
described in chapter 5. Then import the filtered data into the Bayesian network
data analysis model presented in previous chapters in order to predict insider
threat risk levels for each case within one time series.
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7.3.3 Integration
The main purpose of this stage is to integrate the prediction result from the
previous step with the time stamp when the data was collected for each participant
“case”. The output of this step is prediction levels for each participant for all time
slots. For example, if we have six time stamps then we will get six prediction results
for each participant case based on each time-frame, which we will explain later in
this chapter.
7.3.4 Prediction Result
In this final step, the output from the previous stage for each case will be combined
into the dynamic Bayesian Analysis model in order to predict potential malicious
insider threats in the near future for each participant.
7.4 Case Study implementation
The objective of the case study is to implement the proposed Dynamic Bayesian
model for predicting insider threats. The case study uses real data collected over
a single time period, which has been extended with dummy data to represent an-
other five periods of data. In total, therefore, six periods of data is used to run
the proposed model.
The data was collected by means of a survey. Specifically, on the first collection
three surveys were conducted as following: One Technology Aspect survey, One
Organisational Impact survey, and Seventy Human Factor “participants” surveys
were collected. Followed by the second collection three surveys identical to the
first collection surveys were conducted as well on the same UK-based organisation
with over 1000 employees. Around 70 members of staff volunteered to answer
Human Factors part of the surveys questions.
The survey focused on the information needed to complete the 93 end node
variables of the prediction model, as presented in chapter 5, which comprised the
data required to run the proposed model. However, due to the security restriction
of the organisation to keep all participants anonymous we were unable to link
cases from first and second surveys, for this reason we will base this analysis only
on first collection followed by dummy data.
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Each input from the six periods of data was processed using static Bayesian
analysis to predict each input for each participant. A time-stamp was attached
to each prediction result. Table 7.1 illustrates the prediction result from the
proposed prediction model for each year period “ for full table please refers to
Appendix C”. Where case means participant number, as we design this model to
make the individual participants supplying data through the survey repeatedly
in order to generate these different time stamps such as year 1, year 2 etc, then
time represents the time order when data were collected, and Rare, Unlikely, Pos-
sible, Likely, and Certain represents the prediction percentage in respect to insider
threat.
Table 7.1: Part of Prediction Result within Different Time Period
Case Year Rare Unlikely Possible Likely Certain
1
0 0.002 22.413 55.65 15.185 6.749
1 0.002 22.122 55.537 15.374 6.965
2 0.002 21.98 55.246 15.645 7.127
3 0.001 20.28 56.097 16.124 7.499
4 0.002 20.847 56.012 15.847 7.292
5 0.002 20.847 56.012 15.847 7.292
4
0 0.058 30.845 50.985 12.763 5.349
1 0.052 30.499 50.974 12.945 5.53
2 0.051 30.336 50.76 13.188 5.664
3 0.051 30.336 50.76 13.188 5.664
4 0.089 32.909 49.542 12.427 5.032
5 0.089 32.909 49.542 12.427 5.032
20
0 0.027 45.11 44.004 9.075 1.784
1 0.024 44.751 44.139 9.235 1.85
2 0.024 44.604 44.045 9.428 1.899
3 0.024 44.604 44.045 9.428 1.899
4 0.064 46.234 42.976 8.882 1.845
5 0.064 46.234 42.976 8.882 1.845
22
0 0.288 57.307 36.226 5.657 0.522
1 0.26 56.996 36.43 5.772 0.543
2 0.256 56.885 36.401 5.9 0.558
3 0.256 56.885 36.401 5.9 0.558
4 0.234 52.315 39.228 7.187 1.037
5 0.234 52.315 39.228 7.187 1.037
69
0 0.273 52.375 38.871 7.04 1.44
1 0.246 52.035 39.048 7.175 1.496
2 0.242 51.9 38.992 7.329 1.537
3 0.027 42.724 44.664 9.64 2.946
4 0.039 36.078 47.784 11.184 4.915
5 0.039 36.078 47.784 11.184 4.915
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The change we made for the first collection to generate dummy data for other
five time-slots, are divided into three area of changes: a) change in personal cir-
cumstances of the participants over the period, similarly the change in the vari-
ables on the human factor described on chapter 4 , b) change in organisational
environment which reflect the organisational impact, one of theses changes is that
the organisation has had any security breach on any time-slot, and d) the change
to technical measures which impact on Technology aspect, these measures include
adding new tools to prevent insider threat or providing security awareness training.
From Table 7.1 and Appendix C prediction output table data, Insider Threat
levels can be predicted using the Dynamic Bayesian Network. Next, we are going
to choose three from the seventy cases as detailed examples: Case 4, Case 20
and Case 69, as explained in chapter 5 in the section on emergency insider threat
prediction result.
Case Number 04 From the previous predictions result in chapter 5 using
static Bayesian analysis our model predicts that this case is more than 50 % as a
possible insider threat, with 12 % as likely to be an insider threat, and 30 % is
unlikely an insider threat. Also, over six periods of data collected and analysed
using static Bayesian, the prediction result is always being as a Possible insider
threat. In Table 7.1, it can be seen that case 4 at time 0 to 5 reveals an initial
prediction result showing a 50.9% chance of this being a possible insider threat.
At the later time frames, however, the risk of this being a possible insider threat
decreases. In addition, the prediction of this case being unlikely to be an insider
increases as time progresses. The reasons behind these prediction values changing
over the time are mainly due to some change on personal circumstances such the
change on understanding the organisational security policy, also, no change to
work-related stress levels, which are still high over six-time periods.
In this case, after applying DBN to the previous data showed in Table 7.1,
we get the result shown in the chart Figure 7.2. Our DBN model predicted
that the risk level to be an insider threat would increase over two-time slots as it
represented in dotted orange and red lines in the chart.
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Figure 7.2: Case Number 4
Case Number 20 In the previous prediction model result in respect to emer-
gency insider threat prediction in chapter 5, we advised that the security analysis
team should step into this case and analysis it manually to decide which risk level
this case should belong to since in this case the prediction model predicted a bor-
derline outcome between the case being unlikely to be an insider threat and a
possible insider threat.
In chapter 5 we introduce this case as “an employee is between 25 and 45 years
old, she does not understand security policies, has access to the organisation’s
intellectual property and believes that she owns the copyright ownerships. On the
other hand, her motivation level is a normal level”. Then we advise the organisa-
tion to provide her with security awareness training which may reduce her insider
risk levels in future assessments, as she then will understand the organisation’s
security policy and copyright ownership.
Using the Dynamic Insider Threat prediction Model proposed in this chapter,
however, it becomes clear that this participant over two-time slots will be possible
an insider threat, as in all six time-slots prediction she still believes that she owns
the copyright ownerships of the organisation property after the security awareness
training that organisation provided to her. Figure 7.3 illustrates the case number
20 prediction result, where the possibility to be an insider is represented in dotted
orange line.
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Figure 7.3: Case Number 20
Case Number 22 From the previous predictions result in chapter 5 using static
Bayesian analysis our model predicts that this case is 57.3 % is unlikely to be an
insider threat, with 36.2% as a possible insider threat, and only 5.6 % as likely to
be an insider threat. Also, over six periods of data collected and analysed using
static Bayesian, the prediction result is always being as an unlikely insider threat.
In Table 6.1, it can be seen that case 22 at time 0 to 5 reveals an initial prediction
result showing a 57.3 % is an unlikely insider threat. At the later time frames,
however, the risk of this being an unlikely insider threat is decreases but stay over
the prediction of possible insider threat, the reason behind no major change on
the prediction result that because no change of the personal circumstances has
been recorded.
In this case, after applying DBN to the previous data showed in Table 7.1,
we get the result shown in the chart Figure 7.4 . Our DBN model predicted
that the risk level to be an insider threat would decrees over two-time slots as it
represented in dotted orange and red lines in the chart.
Case Number 69 In the previous prediction model result in respect to emer-
gency insider threat prediction in Table 5.13, this case is 52 % of being unlikely to
be an insider threat. With different time collection showed in Table 7.1, it reveals
an initial prediction result as unlikely then changed to possible insider threat at
time-slot 3. The reason of this is the change on the personal circumstances of the
participants from time-slot 3, one of these changes was the participant’s contract
will expire in three mounts.
In this case, it is clear that the prediction result from Figure 7.5 shows a
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Figure 7.4: Case Number 22
Figure 7.5: Case number 69
decrease in the risk of being an insider threat. The reason behind this is that
the survey data shows a change in the contract expiration date, which previously
been less than three months, which it may indicate this employee has left the
organisation.
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7.5 Summary
The previous chapters introduced the static insider threat prediction model, which
is a way to measure the risk level for each authorised user within the organisa-
tion at a single time point. This chapter has focused on improving the insider
threat risk assessment approach, by presenting the dynamic insider threat pre-
diction. This model was introduced to a group of predictions results within one
organisation based over a period of time the data was collected. This will help
organisations to predict potential malicious insider threats in the near future.
Architecture of the Dynamic Insider Threat prediction was proposed and dis-
cussed in this chapter, followed by a case study implementation to predict mali-
cious insider threat for the near future.
We have found that extending our model approach based on the Bayesian
network to a new model based on a Dynamic Bayesian network has the potential to
improving prediction results for the near future, also it provides the organisations
with further information that is helpful to manage and mitigate insider threat.
Chapter 8
Conclusions, Limitation, and
Future Research
8.1 Conclusions
Insider threat issue is one of the most pressing challenges that threaten an or-
ganisation’s information assets. Unfortunately, no single approach can eliminate
this kind of security breach; organisations need to carry out a regular security risk
assessment in regard to insider threats, and to address any gaps on their environ-
ment. In this thesis, we presented a model that predicts a malicious insider threat
before a security breach takes place. Insider threat problems are not like external
threats, an insider has knowledge of all organisational security measures and has
some degree of trust from the organisation.
We used a multiple-perspective approach, where more than 100 key insider
indicators were collected for each authorised user, which were divided into three-
dimensions. Then we used these indicator values to calculate the risk levels for
each authorised user, based on Bayes theorem.
Also, we presented the emergency insider threat risk prediction level results for
two selected organisations, the result shows that our model gives a worthy result in
predicting any malicious insider threat, with the possibility to find and address the
vulnerable area within the organisation that needs to improve to mitigate the risk.
Finally, we proposed a new method to predict insider threats over a period
of time, based on data collected and analysed on different time scales, called a
dynamic model Approach.
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8.2 Limitations
This section considers the limitations for the proposed work in this thesis.
• The first limitation to this study was the use of a prior probability distri-
bution which was based on judgement and literature review, as little insider
threat evidence is available for researchers.
• Second, organisation policy prevents us from getting participant’s names in
this study, to compare the prediction result with any insider security breach
which occurred. For this reason, it was hard to validate this approach within
the organisation.
8.3 Contributions Revisited
The contributions of this study can be summarised as follows:
• A detailed definition of the insider threat has been introduced that makes a
clear distinction between malicious or unintentional breaches, authorisation
access, with the impact to the information security goals (chapter 2).
• Insider threat categories have been devided into seven sub-categories, based
on the manner in which they affect the organisation’s information secur-
ity goals (confidentiality, integrity, and availability), and the human factors
which lead an insider to act in a malicious manner (motive, opportunity, and
capability ( chapter 2 ).
• An in-depth literature review that presents an unique view of the current
state of the art about insider threat mitigation approaches has been dis-
cussed. We classified these approaches into two main categories: a) tech-
nical mitigation approaches and b) non-technical mitigation approaches (
chapter 3 ).
• A multiple perspective frameworks has been proposed to reduce the risk of
insider threat by predicting who could be an insider threat ( chapter 4 ).
• A Bayesian model has been developed to implement the proposed framework
( chapter 4 ).
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• The model of Insider threat risk prediction has been tested on data collected
using surveys and analysed using the model for the final result( chapter 5 ).
• A new architecture has been introduced based on an extension to the pre-
vious framework, the novelty of this approach is on designing a dynamic
insider threat prediction model with time series (chapter 7 ).
• The insider threat risk prediction result has been evaluated by using prob-
ability election method based on comparing the model results with experts
judgements ( chapter 6 ).
8.4 Future Research
This section provides intuition into how to extend the research reported in this
thesis.
Dealing with trust is a difficult issue that involves researchers looking at the
problem from a holistic perspective in terms of: a) Human behaviour, b)Technology
controls and c) Organisational aspects. Future research is highly recommended
by different institutions to cover the following points:
• More in-depth research is needed, to discover the cause behaviour that drives
privileged users to act malicious insider threat. This will lead to the iden-
tification of the mitigating factors and indicators of malicious or accidental
insider threats.
• To develop a comprehensive prediction model, which can integrate with all
other approaches.
• Investigate the changing behaviour for human, organisation, and technology
factors over a period of time to get accurate prediction results.
• To develop a model that provides guidance to mitigate such a threat based
on the prediction result.
• Finally, research is required to identify the effects of information security
policy for organisations in term of insider threat risk levels.
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Technology Aspect 
Start of Block: Introduction 
 
 Emergency Insider Threat Risk Predictions: PhD Project Survey.    
 
This survey is a part of PhD student research work, which is being carried out at Loughborough 
University, in the Computer Science Department in collaboration with the School of Business 
and Economics.     
 
 The survey is the key to determining how to deliver a significantly enhanced capability of 
managing malicious insider cyber-security threats, and also how to educate and to spread 
materials and strategies for mitigation of malicious insider threats. Your cooperation will help to 
ensure that my research is relevant for your organisation.   
 
  Please complete the survey based on the best of your knowledge. If you complete this survey, 
you are consenting to have your anonymised responses included as part of data collection for 
this survey. However, you can enter your name in the last field if you wish to let us know who 
you are.    
 
 Please complete the entire survey. There are 20 questions over 3 pages and we estimate that it 
should take at most 8 minutes of your time, To start please press Start button at the bottom of 
this page, and to submit the survey, please click Submit at the bottom of the last page.  
  
  If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact us at: n.elmrabit@lboro.ac.uk  
Thank you very much for your response.  
 
Nebrase Elmrabit 
PhD Research Student. 
 
 
Page Break  
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End of Block: Introduction  
Start of Block: Block 1 
 
Q1  How much does your organisation allocate to the IT budget in one year?  
o Less than 5% of overall budget.    
o Between 5% and 9% of overall budget.    
o Over 9% of overall budget.    
 
 
 
Q2  
 
 How much of the IT budget is spent on IT security? 
o Less than 10% of the overall IT budget.    
o Between 10 % and 25% of the overall IT budget.    
o Over 25% of the overall IT budget.    
 
 
 
Q3  
 
 How much of the IT security budget is spent on protection from insider threats? 
o Less than 10% of the overall IT security budget.    
o Between 10 % and 25% of the overall IT security budget.    
o  Over 25% of the overall IT security budget.    
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Q4 Do you have any concerns regarding security threats coming from authorised users? 
o Yes, very important.    
o Not at all, we trust all our authorised users.    
 
 
 
Q5  Does your organisation provide any security awareness and training strategy? 
o Yes.    
o No.    
 
 
 
Q6 Does your organisation encourage all authorised users to attend security awareness and 
training programmes? 
o Yes.  All authorised user include employees, contractors or anyone who has authorised 
access to our system.    
o Yes, but just with regard to our employees.    
o  No.    
 
 
 
Q7 How often do your employees attend security awareness and training programmes? 
o Once.    
o Annually.    
o Never.    
 
 
Page Break  
  
  Page 4 of 9 
 
Q8 Has your organisation suffered any information security breach in the last 5 years? 
o Yes.    
o  No.    
 
 
 
Q9 Has your organisation suffered any security breach that was accidently caused by an 
authorized user in the last 5 years? 
o Yes.    
o No.    
 
 
 
Q10  Has your organisation been under attack from external threats? 
o Yes.    
o No.    
 
 
 
Q11 Has your organisation suffered any security breach caused by an authorised user in the 
last 5 years? 
o Yes    
o No.    
 
 
Display This Question: 
If Has your organisation suffered any security breach caused by an authorised user in the last 5 
years? = Yes 
 
Q12-1  
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If you have answered Yes to the previous question, please let us know which type of authorised 
user security breach your organisation suffered?   You can select more than one. 
▢ Insider IT Fraud.    
▢ Insider Theft of Intellectual Property.    
▢ Insider IT Sabotage.    
▢ Insider Social Engineering.    
▢ Insider In Cloud Computing.    
▢ Insider National Security.    
 
 
Display This Question: 
If Has your organisation suffered any security breach caused by an authorised user in the last 5 
years? = Yes 
 
Q12-2 What action was taken against any malicious authorized user ? 
▢ Update security policy.    
▢ Implementing a new security strategy.    
▢ Training and awareness.    
▢ Termination of an employee.    
▢ Other action.Please specify   
________________________________________________ 
 
End of Block: Block 1  
Start of Block: Block 2 
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Q13 Which of the following IT security tools has your organisation implemented in order to 
detect an insider threat? You can select one or more. 
▢ Data Loss Prevention (DLP).    
▢ Security Information and Event Management (SIEM).    
▢ Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)    
▢ Access Control System (ACL).    
▢ Proxy Server.    
▢ Document Tagging.    
▢ Honey-tokens    
▢ Other. Please specify in detail……..   
________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Q14   Which of the following statements best describes how security and privacy controls are 
integrated to detect insider threats? 
o A single solution that combines all alerts into a single insider threat report.    
o Multi solutions that generate a multi insider threats report or alert.    
o There is no integration at the moment.    
o Other. Please specify……..   
________________________________________________ 
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Q15 Which of the following statements best describes how the external and insider threat 
detection systems are integrated? 
o Fully technology integrated.    
o Semi technology integrated.    
o Not technology integrated.    
o Other. Please specify……..   
________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Q16  Which of the following data are logged on the organisation’s system to help detect an 
insider threat? You can select one or more. 
▢  Network traffic.    
▢  Online activity.    
▢  Emails.    
▢  Removable Storage Devices.    
▢  User Login and Logout to IT systems.    
▢  Other. Please specify……..   
________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Q17 What proportion of false insider alerts are generated by the security system? 
o More than 90% are false alerts.    
o Between 40 % and 90 % are false alerts.    
o Between 10 % and 40 % are false alerts.    
o Less than 10 % are false    
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Q18  In previous security breaches, how did your organisation detect an insider threat? You can 
select one or more. 
▢    Accidently detected by a member of staff.    
▢    Detected by a member of staff who was following clear insider threat guidelines and 
training.    
▢    Detected by IT security system after the breach had taken place.    
▢    Detected by IT security system before the breach had taken place.    
▢    Other, please specify…….   
________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Q19  In previous security breaches, how many insider attacks has your system failed to detect? 
o All or most of them were not detected by our system.    
o Our system failed to detect most of them.    
o None of them escaped our system.    
 
 
 
Q20  Regarding employee termination period, has your organisation applied any extra 
measurement to monitor user activity in this period of time? 
o Yes. Please specify what action was taken……........   
________________________________________________ 
o No.    
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 Please enter your name and position if you wish to be knowing to us. You have the right not to 
answer this. 
▢    Name   ________________________________________________ 
▢    Position   ________________________________________________ 
▢    Any other information you would like us to know.   
________________________________________________ 
 
End of Block: Block 2  
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Organisational Impact 
 
 Emergency Insider Threat Risk Predictions: PhD Project Survey.  
 
This survey is a part of PhD student research work, which is being carried out at Loughborough 
University, in the Computer Science Department in collaboration with the School of Business 
and Economics.       
 
  The survey is the key to determining how to deliver a significantly enhanced capability of 
managing malicious insider cyber-security threats, and also how to educate and to spread 
materials and strategies for mitigation of malicious insider threats. Your cooperation will help to 
ensure that my research is relevant for your organisation.  
 
 Please complete the survey based on the best of your knowledge. If you complete this survey, 
you are consenting to have your anonymised responses included as part of data collection for 
this survey. However, you can enter your name in the last field if you wish to let us know who 
you are.   
 
Please complete the entire survey. There are 17 questions over 3 pages and we estimate that it 
should take at most 8 minutes of your time, To start please press Start button at the bottom of 
this page, and to submit the survey, please click Submit at the bottom of the last page.   
 
 If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact us at: n.elmrabit@lboro.ac.uk     
    Thank you very much for your response.  
    
 Nebrase Elmrabit   
PhD Research Student. 
 
 
Page Break  
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Start of Block: Block 1 
 
Q1  
 
What sector does your organisation belong to? 
o Public.    
o Private.    
o Banking and financial.    
o Education.    
o Other. Please specify……..   
________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Q2 What is your organisation size in terms of employee numbers? 
o Fewer than 50 employees.    
o Between 50 and 250 employees.    
o More than 250 employees.    
 
 
 
Q3  Does your organisation have its own IT security department? 
o Yes.    
o No.    
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Q4 Does your organisation outsource IT services? 
o Yes.    
o No.    
 
 
 
Q5 Does your organisation outsource IT security services? 
o Yes.    
o No.    
 
 
 
Q6 Does your organisation have a written security policy? 
o Yes.    
o No.     
 
 
 
Q7 How often does your organisation update or review its security policy? 
o Annually.    
o Every 5 years.    
o No reviews or updates.    
o Other, please describe……   
________________________________________________ 
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Q8  Do all authorised users follow your organisation’s security policy? 
o Yes.    
o No, because currently we do not have a system that controls and enforces this policy.    
o No, please specify why…   ________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Q9 Does your organisation apply criminal records checks for people it employs before giving 
them access to IT systems? 
o Yes.    
o No.    
o Other. Please specify……..   
________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Q10 Does your organisation recruit people from overseas? 
o Yes.    
o No.    
 
 
Page Break  
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Q11 Has your organisation suffered any information security breach in the last 5 years? 
o Yes.    
o  No.    
 
 
 
Q12 Has your organisation suffered any security breach that was accidently caused by an 
authorized user in the last 5 years? 
o Yes.    
o No.    
 
 
 
Q13  Has your organisation been under attack from external threats? 
o Yes.    
o No.    
 
 
 
Q14 Has your organisation suffered any security breach caused by an authorised user in the 
last 5 years? 
o Yes    
o No.    
 
 
Display This Question: 
If Has your organisation suffered any security breach caused by an authorised user in the last 5 
years? = Yes 
 
Q15-1  
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If you have answered Yes to the previous question, please let us know which type of authorised 
user security breach your organisation suffered.  You can select more than one. 
▢    Insider IT Fraud.    
▢    Insider Theft of Intellectual Property.    
▢    Insider IT Sabotage.    
▢    Insider Social Engineering.    
▢    Insider In Cloud Computing.    
▢    Insider National Security.    
 
 
Display This Question: 
If Has your organisation suffered any security breach caused by an authorised user in the last 5 
years? = Yes 
 
Q15-2  
What action was taken against any malicious authorized user? 
▢    Update security policy.    
▢    Implementing a new security strategy.    
▢    Training and awareness.    
▢    Termination of an employee.    
▢    Other action.Please specify   
________________________________________________ 
 
 
Page Break  
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End of Block: Block 1  
Start of Block: Block 2 
 
Q16  
 
Do you recognise any of the following symptoms at work? You can select one or more 
statements if applicable. 
▢    Low morale.    
▢    Industrial relation difficulties.    
▢    High absenteeism.    
▢    Increase in long-term illness.    
▢    increased or high turnover of staff.    
▢    Increased litigation.    
▢    Reduced efficiency.    
▢    Poor performance in tasks.    
▢    Poor quality control.    
▢    Deadlines not being reached.    
▢    Increase in accidents.    
 
 Please enter your name and position if you wish to be knowing to us. You have the right not to 
answer this. 
▢     Name   ________________________________________________ 
▢     Position   ________________________________________________ 
▢    Any other information you would like us to know.   
________________________________________________ 
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Human Factor 
 
 Emergency Insider Threat Risk Predictions: PhD Project Survey.    
 
This survey is a part of PhD student research work, which is being carried out at Loughborough 
University, in the Computer Science Department in collaboration with the School of Business 
and Economics.     
 
 The survey is the key to determining how to deliver a significantly enhanced capability of 
managing malicious insider cyber-security threats, and also how to educate and to spread 
materials and strategies for mitigation of malicious insider threats. Your cooperation will help to 
ensure that my research is relevant for your organisation.    
 
 Please complete the survey based on the best of your knowledge. If you complete this survey, 
you are consenting to have your anonymised responses included as part of data collection for 
this survey. However, you can enter your name in the last field if you wish to let us know who 
you are.    
 
 Please complete the entire survey. There are 29 questions over 3 pages and we estimate that it 
should take at most 4 minutes of your time, To start please press Start button at the bottom of 
this page, and to submit the survey, please click Submit at the bottom of the last page.     
If you have any further questions, please feel free to contact us at: n.elmrabit@lboro.ac.uk  
Thank you very much for your response.  
Nebrase Elmrabit 
PhD Research Student. 
 
End of Block: Block 1  
Start of Block: Human Factors 
Page Break  
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Q1 How old are you?  
o Less than 25 years old.    
o Between 25 and 45 years old.    
o Over 45 years old.    
 
 
 
Q2 What is your gender? 
o Female.    
o Male.    
 
 
 
Q3 How would you best describe your relationship with the organisation? 
o Current employee.    
o Contractor, Freelancer, Consultant.    
o Other, please specify…….   ________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Q4  How long have you been working for this organisation? 
o Less than a year.    
o Between one year and 3 years.    
o Over 3 years.    
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Q5  How best do you describe your role within the organisation? 
o Scientist.    
o Engineer.    
o IT    
o Administrator.    
o Contractor.    
o Other, please specify…….   ________________________________________________ 
 
 
 
Q6 How long have you been working in this role? 
o Less than 1 year.    
o Between one year and 3 years.    
o Over 3 years.    
 
 
 
Q7  If you are a current employee, when does your contract expire? 
o In less than 3 months.    
o Over 3 months and less than 1 year.    
o Over one year contract.    
o Other. Please describe ……   
________________________________________________ 
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Q8 Do you understand your organisation’s information security policy? 
o Yes.    
o No.    
o Other, please specify.   ________________________________________________ 
 
 
Page Break  
 
Q9  If work gets difficult, do your colleagues help you? 
o Always.    
o Sometimes.    
o Never.    
 
 
 
Q10 Do you receive the respect at work you feel you deserve from your colleagues? 
o Always.    
o Sometimes.    
o Never.    
 
 
 
Q11 Are your colleagues willing to listen to your work-related problems? 
o Always.    
o Sometimes.    
o Never.    
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Q12  Is there friction or anger between colleagues? 
o Never.    
o Sometimes.    
o Always.    
 
 
 
Q13  Are relationships at work strained?  
▢   Always.  (15)  
▢   Sometimes.  (16)  
▢   Never.  (17)  
 
 
 
Q14  
 Do you have sufficient opportunities to question managers about changes at work? 
o Always.    
o Sometimes.  (10)  
o Never.    
 
 
 
Q15  
 
When changes are made at work, are you clear how they will work out in practice? 
o Always.    
o Sometimes.  (10)  
o Never.    
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Q16 Can you decide when to take a break? 
o Always.    
o Sometimes.    
o Never.  (13)  
 
 
 
Q17  Do you have a choice in deciding how to do your work? 
o Always.    
o Sometime.  (10)  
o Never.    
 
 
 
Q18  Do you have some say over the way you work? 
o Always.    
o Sometimes.  (10)  
o Never.    
 
 
 
Q19 Are you given supportive feedback with regard to the work you do? 
o Always.    
o Sometimes.    
o Never.  (10)  
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Q20 Can you rely on your line manager to help you out with a work problem? 
o Always.    
o Sometimes.    
o Never.    
 
 
 
Q21  Can you talk to your line manager about something that has upset or annoyed you about 
work? 
o Always.    
o Sometimes.    
o Never.    
 
 
 
Q22  Are you supported through emotionally demanding work? 
o Always.    
o Sometimes.    
o Never.    
 
 
 
Q23 Is it clear what is expected of you at work? 
o Always.    
o Sometimes.    
o Never.    
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Q24 Do you know how to go about getting your job done? 
o Always.    
o Sometimes.    
o Never.    
 
 
 
Q25 Do you understand how your work fits into the overall aim of the organisation? 
o Always.    
o Sometimes.    
o Never.    
 
 
 
Q26 Do you have higher work capabilities than your colleagues? 
o Always.    
o Sometimes.    
o Never.    
 
End of Block: Human Factors  
Start of Block: Block 2 
 
Q27   Are you a part of the design or implementation process team? 
o Always.    
o Sometimes.    
o Never.    
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Q28  Do you have access to the organisation’s intellectual property? 
o Always.    
o Sometime.    
o Never.    
 
 
 
Q29  Do you feel that the copyright for you own created work is your own intellectual property 
and does not belong to your organisation?   
o Always.    
o Sometimes.    
o Never.    
 
 
 
Q37 Please enter your name and position if you wish to be knowing to us. You have the right 
not to answer this. 
▢   Name   ________________________________________________ 
▢   Position   ________________________________________________ 
▢   Any other information you would like us to know.   
________________________________________________ 
 
End of Block: Block 2  
 
Appendix B
A list of all variables with
changing of the probability for a
selected Cases 4,20.22.69
137
 
All Variables (end nodes and internals 
nodes) 
Case number with changing of probabilities 
4 20 22 69 
Predict 
Possible 
insider 
threat 
Unlikely to 
be insider 
threat 
Unlikely to be 
insider threat 
Unlikely to 
be insider 
threat 
Predict % 50.99% 45.11% 57.31% 52.38% 
Predict Probability for Rare to be insider 
threat 
0.06% 0.03% 0.29% 0.27% 
PredictProbability for Unlikely to be 
insider threat 
30.85% 45.11% 57.31% 52.38% 
PredictProbability for Possible insider 
threat 
50.99% 44.00% 36.23% 38.87% 
PredictProbability for Likely to be insider 
threat 
12.76% 9.08% 5.66% 7.04% 
PredictProbability for Certain is insider 
threat 
5.35% 1.78% 0.52% 1.44% 
Predict(Technology Factors (T)) Moderate performance and low focus on Insider threat 
PredictProbability for Technology Factors 96.83% 96.17% 95.37% 95.61% 
PredictProbability(Technology Factors 
(T)=Extreme performance and focus on 
Insider threat) 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
PredictProbability(Technology Factors 
(T)=High performance and focus on 
Insider threat) 
3.17% 3.83% 4.64% 4.39% 
PredictProbability(Technology Factors 
(T)=Moderate  performance and low 
focus on Insider threat) 
96.83% 96.17% 95.37% 95.61% 
PredictProbability(Technology Factors 
(T)=Low performance and no focus on 
Insider threat) 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Predict(Budget) Low Low Low Low 
PredictProbability(Budget=High) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
PredictProbability(Budget=Medium) 4.93% 5.13% 5.37% 5.30% 
PredictProbability(Budget=Low) 95.07% 94.87% 94.63% 94.70% 
RetractedLogLikelihood(Budget) -75.6 -75.5 -80.8 -76.2 
Predict(Security Awareness and Training) Low Low Low Low 
PredictProbability(Security Awareness 
and Training=High) 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
PredictProbability(Security Awareness 
and Training=Medium) 
2.33% 2.44% 2.56% 2.52% 
PredictProbability(Security Awareness 
and Training=Low) 
97.67% 97.56% 97.44% 97.48% 
Predict(Security & Privacy Controls) Medium Medium Medium Medium 
PredictProbability(Security & Privacy 
Controls=High) 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
PredictProbability(Security & Privacy 
Controls=Medium) 
95.39% 95.43% 95.46% 95.45% 
PredictProbability(Security & Privacy 
Controls=Low) 
4.61% 4.58% 4.54% 4.55% 
Predict(Integration) No No No No 
PredictProbability(Integration=Yes) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
PredictProbability(Integration=Part Yes) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
PredictProbability(Integration=No) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Predict(Tools & Controls) Medium Medium Medium Medium 
PredictProbability(Tools & 
Controls=High) 
7.79% 7.79% 7.79% 7.79% 
PredictProbability(Tools & 
Controls=Medium) 
92.09% 92.09% 92.09% 92.09% 
PredictProbability(Tools & Controls=Low) 0.12% 0.12% 0.12% 0.12% 
Predict(Digital Evidence ) High High High High 
PredictProbability(Digital 
Evidence =High) 
83.77% 83.80% 83.83% 83.82% 
PredictProbability(Digital 
Evidence =Medium) 
16.23% 16.20% 16.16% 16.17% 
PredictProbability(Digital Evidence =Low) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Predict(Detection Level) High High High High 
PredictProbability(Detection Level=High) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
PredictProbability(Detection 
Level=Medium) 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
PredictProbability(Detection Level=Low) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Predict(Detection) Medium Medium Medium Medium 
PredictProbability(Detection=High) 1.82% 1.82% 1.82% 1.82% 
PredictProbability(Detection=Medium) 98.18% 98.18% 98.18% 98.18% 
PredictProbability(Detection=Low) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
PredictProbability(Undetected) 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
PredictProbability(Undetected=must of 
them) 
0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
PredictProbability(Undetected=None of 
them) 
100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 
Predict(Investment) Low Low Low Low 
PredictProbability(Investment=High) 0.05% 0.06% 0.07% 0.07% 
PredictProbability(Investment=Medium) 10.50% 11.10% 11.83% 11.61% 
PredictProbability(Investment=Low) 89.45% 88.84% 88.10% 88.33% 
Predict(Organisational Aspects (O)) Natural culture 
PredictProbability(Organisational 
Aspects (O)=Non fertile environmental 
culture for Insider threat) 
1.29% 1.48% 1.68% 1.61% 
PredictProbability(Organisational 
Aspects (O)=Natural culture ) 
98.64% 98.47% 98.29% 98.35% 
PredictProbability(Organisational 
Aspects (O)=Fertile environmental 
culture for Insider threat) 
0.07% 0.05% 0.03% 0.04% 
Predict(Security Policy) Medium Medium Medium Medium 
PredictProbability(Security Policy=High) 1.48% 1.53% 1.57% 1.56% 
PredictProbability(Security 
Policy=Medium) 
98.39% 98.34% 98.30% 98.31% 
PredictProbability(Security Policy=Low) 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 0.13% 
Following 
No 
enforcement 
system 
No 
enforcement 
system 
No 
enforcement 
system 
No 
enforcement 
system 
Predict(Structure) Medium Medium Medium Medium 
PredictProbability(Structure=High) 5.13% 5.12% 5.11% 5.12% 
PredictProbability(Structure=Medium) 92.13% 92.07% 92.01% 92.03% 
PredictProbability(Structure=Low) 2.74% 2.81% 2.88% 2.86% 
Predict(Recruiting) Medium Medium Medium Medium 
PredictProbability(Recruiting=High) 7.60% 7.60% 7.59% 7.60% 
PredictProbability(Recruiting=Medium) 86.12% 86.08% 86.05% 86.06% 
PredictProbability(Recruiting=Low) 6.28% 6.32% 6.36% 6.35% 
Predict(Security Breach) Medium Medium Medium Medium 
PredictProbability(Security Breach=Very 
High) 
0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 
PredictProbability(Security Breach=High) 4.41% 4.38% 4.36% 4.37% 
PredictProbability(Security 
Breach=Medium) 
84.60% 84.53% 84.44% 84.47% 
PredictProbability(Security Breach=Low) 10.98% 11.09% 11.20% 11.16% 
Predict(History) Low Low Low Low 
PredictProbability(History=Very High) 0.03% 0.02% 0.02% 0.02% 
PredictProbability(History=High) 6.42% 6.39% 6.37% 6.38% 
PredictProbability(History=Medium) 18.69% 18.68% 18.66% 18.67% 
PredictProbability(History=Low) 74.86% 74.91% 74.95% 74.93% 
Predict(Action) Low Low Low Low 
PredictProbability(Action=High) 3.38% 3.41% 3.43% 3.42% 
PredictProbability(Action=Medium) 38.88% 38.93% 38.98% 38.96% 
PredictProbability(Action=Low) 57.74% 57.67% 57.59% 57.62% 
Predict(Human Factors (H)) High Medium Medium Medium 
PredictProbability(Human Factors 
(H)=Very High) 
10.14% 2.39% 0.66% 2.43% 
PredictProbability(Human Factors 
(H)=High) 
47.18% 26.26% 8.10% 15.92% 
PredictProbability(Human Factors 
(H)=Medium) 
41.25% 70.40% 83.39% 74.32% 
PredictProbability(Human Factors 
(H)=Low) 
1.39% 0.94% 7.66% 7.15% 
PredictProbability(Human Factors 
(H)=Very Low) 
0.04% 0.02% 0.20% 0.19% 
Predict(Motive) High Medium Medium Medium 
PredictProbability(Motive=Very High) 18.88% 0.63% 0.33% 0.22% 
PredictProbability(Motive=High) 48.94% 16.56% 8.38% 3.40% 
PredictProbability(Motive=Medium) 31.46% 74.34% 79.77% 65.12% 
PredictProbability(Motive=Low) 0.69% 6.27% 9.53% 21.44% 
PredictProbability(Motive=Very Low) 0.04% 2.21% 1.99% 9.83% 
Predict(Opportunity) Medium Medium Low Medium 
PredictProbability(Opportunity=High) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 1.55% 
PredictProbability(Opportunity=Medium) 83.22% 96.98% 34.28% 64.47% 
PredictProbability(Opportunity=Low) 16.78% 3.02% 65.72% 33.97% 
Predict(Capability) High High Medium Medium 
PredictProbability(Capability=High) 68.99% 54.86% 29.55% 47.10% 
PredictProbability(Capability=Medium) 29.68% 43.35% 66.83% 51.22% 
PredictProbability(Capability=Low) 1.33% 1.80% 3.62% 1.68% 
Predict(Work-related Stress Level) High Medium Medium Low 
PredictProbability(Work-related Stress 
Level=High) 
76.22% 3.07% 1.58% 0.87% 
PredictProbability(Work-related Stress 
Level=Medium) 
23.42% 81.09% 80.98% 13.22% 
PredictProbability(Work-related Stress 
Level=Low) 
0.36% 15.85% 17.44% 85.91% 
Predict(Age, Gender and policy) High Medium Medium Medium 
PredictProbability(Age, Gender and 
policy=High) 
70.34% 20.85% 34.87% 46.82% 
PredictProbability(Age, Gender and 
policy=Medium) 
29.37% 74.64% 57.47% 51.93% 
PredictProbability(Age, Gender and 
policy=Low) 
0.29% 4.51% 7.67% 1.26% 
Predict(Relation to Organisation) Medium High Medium Medium 
PredictProbability(Relation to 
Organisation=High) 
10.40% 62.07% 4.29% 0.00% 
PredictProbability(Relation to 
Organisation=Medium) 
81.83% 37.93% 74.42% 51.55% 
PredictProbability(Relation to 
Organisation=Low) 
7.76% 0.00% 21.29% 48.45% 
Predict(System Role) Medium High Low Low 
PredictProbability(System Role=High) 7.57% 55.42% 0.00% 0.00% 
PredictProbability(System Role=Medium) 75.28% 44.58% 18.56% 31.18% 
PredictProbability(System Role=Low) 17.15% 0.00% 81.44% 68.82% 
Predict(Role) High High High High 
PredictProbability(Role=High) 66.63% 60.33% 87.56% 91.08% 
PredictProbability(Role=Medium) 33.37% 39.67% 12.44% 8.92% 
PredictProbability(Role=Low) 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 0.00% 
Predict(Access) High High Medium Medium 
PredictProbability(Access=High) 59.11% 52.60% 0.00% 21.01% 
PredictProbability(Access=Medium) 40.89% 47.40% 78.64% 74.71% 
PredictProbability(Access=Low) 0.00% 0.00% 21.36% 4.28% 
Age 
Between 25 
and 45 
Between 25 
and 45 
Between 25 
and 45 
Between 25 
and 45 
Gender Male Female Male Male 
Type of Employment 
Current 
employee 
Current 
employee 
Current 
employee 
Current 
employee 
Employment period 
Between 
one year 
and Three 
years 
Over Three 
years 
Between one 
year and 
Three years 
Less than a 
year 
Position Other Academic Administrator Scientist 
Position Period 
Between 
one year 
and Three 
Years 
Over Three 
years 
Less than a 
year 
Less than a 
year 
Contract Expiration 
Over One 
year 
Over One 
year 
Over One 
year 
Less than 
One year 
Understanding Security Policy No No Yes No 
Peer support Negative Nature Nature Positive 
Colleagues help Never Sometime Sometime Sometime 
Colleagues Respect Never Sometime Always Always 
Colleagues listen to work-related 
problems 
Sometime Sometime Always Always 
Own decision of how to do the task Sometime Always Sometime Always 
Change practice Sometime Sometime Sometime Sometime 
Change opinion Never Sometime Sometime Always 
Anger between colleagues Sometime Sometime Sometime Sometime 
Work strained relationships Sometime Sometime Sometime Sometime 
Relationships Nature Nature Nature Nature 
Change Negative Nature Nature Positive 
Control Nature Positive Nature Positive 
Way of work opinion Sometime Always Sometime Always 
Own break decision Sometime Always Always Sometime 
Managers' support Low Medium Medium Medium 
Talking to line manager regarding 
upseting from work 
Never Sometime Sometime Sometime 
Rely on line manager to help with a work 
problem 
Never Sometime Sometime Sometime 
Supportive feedback Never Sometime Sometime Sometime 
Emotionally support Never Sometime Never Sometime 
Work knowledge Sometime Always Sometime Always 
Work experience Always Always Always Always 
Work aims Always Sometime Always Always 
Higher work capabilities Sometime Sometime Always Sometime 
Intellectual property Sometime Sometime Never Sometime 
Design or implementation team Sometime Sometime Sometime Sometime 
Copyright ownership Always Always Sometime Sometime 
Pre-employment checks No No No No 
Foreign employee Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Implemented Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Update or review 
Every Five 
years 
Every Five 
years 
Every Five 
years 
Every Five 
years 
Outsource Medium Medium Medium Medium 
PredictProbability(Outsource=High) 9.61% 9.61% 9.61% 9.61% 
PredictProbability(Outsource=Medium) 89.25% 89.24% 89.23% 89.23% 
PredictProbability(Outsource=Low) 1.14% 1.15% 1.16% 1.16% 
Predict(IT security department) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Predict(IT services) Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Predict(IT security services) No No No No 
Predict(Information security breach last 
Five years) 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Predict(Authorised user breach in last 
Five years) 
No No No No 
Predict(Type of authorised user security 
breach last Five years) 
Low Low Low Low 
PredictProbability(Type of authorised 
user security breach last Five years=Very 
High) 
0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 0.03% 
PredictProbability(Type of authorised 
user security breach last Five years=High) 
7.79% 7.76% 7.73% 7.74% 
PredictProbability(Type of authorised 
user security breach last Five 
years=Medium) 
17.32% 17.31% 17.29% 17.30% 
PredictProbability(Type of authorised 
user security breach last Five years=Low) 
74.86% 74.91% 74.95% 74.93% 
IT Fraud No No No No 
Theft of intellectual property No No No No 
National security No No No No 
In cloud computing No No No No 
Social engineering No No No No 
IT sabotage No No No No 
Accidently Authorised  user breach in last 
Five years 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
External threat Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Predict(Insider threat) Low Low Low Low 
PredictProbability(Insider threat=Very 
High) 
0.03% 0.03% 0.02% 0.03% 
PredictProbability(Insider threat=High) 7.11% 7.07% 7.05% 7.06% 
PredictProbability(Insider 
threat=Medium) 
18.01% 17.99% 17.98% 17.98% 
PredictProbability(Insider threat=Low) 74.86% 74.91% 74.95% 74.93% 
Update security policy No No No No 
implement new security strategy No No No No 
Training and awareness No No No No 
Employee termination No No No No 
IT Budget 
Between 3% 
and 9% 
Between 3% 
and 9% 
Between 3% 
and 9% 
Between 3% 
and 9% 
IT security budget of IT budget 
Less than 
10% 
Less than 
10% 
Less than 
10% 
Less than 
10% 
IT security budget for Insider Threat Less than 5% Less than 5% Less than 5% Less than 5% 
Concerns of Insider Threat Not at all Not at all Not at all Not at all 
Provide security awareness and training No No No No 
User groups No No No No 
How often attending SAaT Never Never Never Never 
DLP No No No No 
SIEM Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Proxy server Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ACL Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IDS Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Honey-tokens No No No No 
Document Tagging No No No No 
Other Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Security & Privacy controls integration to 
detect Insider 
No 
integration 
No 
integration 
No 
integration 
No 
integration 
External & Insider threats integration 
Not 
technology 
integration 
Not 
technology 
integration 
Not 
technology 
integration 
Not 
technology 
integration 
Network traffic Yes Yes Yes Yes 
other Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Employee termination period extra 
measures 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Login & logout Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Removable storage devices No No No No 
Emails Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Online activity Yes Yes Yes Yes 
False insider alerts 
Less than 
10% false 
Less than 
10% false 
Less than 
10% false 
Less than 
10% false 
Accidently by a staff Yes Yes Yes Yes 
by a staff how following guidelines aand 
training 
No No No No 
IT security system before or after the 
breach 
No No No No 
Other ways No No No No 
Employees Work-related Stress 
Symptoms 
Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Low morale Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Poor performance in tasks Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reduced efficiency No No No No 
Increased litigation No No No No 
increased or high turnover of staff Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Increase in long-term illness Yes Yes Yes Yes 
High absenteeism No No No No 
Industrial relation difficulties No No No No 
increase in accidents No No No No 
Deadlines not being reached Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Poor quality control No No No No 
Undetected 
None of 
them 
None of 
them 
None of them 
None of 
them 
Following 
No 
enforcement 
system 
No 
enforcement 
system 
No 
enforcement 
system 
No 
enforcement 
system 
Age 
Between 25 
and 45 
Between 25 
and 45 
Between 25 
and 45 
Between 25 
and 45 
Gender Male Female Male Male 
Type of Employment 
Current 
employee 
Current 
employee 
Current 
employee 
Current 
employee 
Employment period 
Between 1 
year and 3 
years 
Over 3 years 
Between 1 
year and 3 
years 
Less than a 
year 
Position Other Academic Administrator Scientist 
Position Period 
Between 1 
year and 3 
Years 
Over 3 years 
Less than a 
year 
Less than a 
year 
Contract Expiration Over 1 year Over 1 year Over 1 year 
Less than 1 
year 
Understanding Security Policy No No Yes No 
Colleagues help Never Sometime Sometime Sometime 
Colleagues Respect Never Sometime Always Always 
Colleagues listen to work-related 
problems 
Sometime Sometime Always Always 
Own decision of how to do the task Sometime Always Sometime Always 
Change practice Sometime Sometime Sometime Sometime 
Change opinion Never Sometime Sometime Always 
Anger between colleagues Sometime Sometime Sometime Sometime 
Work strained relationships Sometime Sometime Sometime Sometime 
Way of work opinion Sometime Always Sometime Always 
Own break decision Sometime Always Always Sometime 
Talking to line manager regarding 
upsetting from work 
Never Sometime Sometime Sometime 
Rely on line manager to help with a work 
problem 
Never Sometime Sometime Sometime 
Supportive feedback Never Sometime Sometime Sometime 
Emotionally support Never Sometime Never Sometime 
Work knowledge Sometime Always Sometime Always 
Work experience Always Always Always Always 
Work aims Always Sometime Always Always 
Higher work capabilities Sometime Sometime Always Sometime 
Intellectual property Sometime Sometime Never Sometime 
Design or implementation team Sometime Sometime Sometime Sometime 
Copyright ownership Always Always Sometime  
Pre-employment checks No No No No 
Foreign employee Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Implemented Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Update or review 
Every Five 
years 
Every Five 
years 
Every Five 
years 
Every Five 
years 
IT security department Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IT services Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IT security services No No No No 
Information security breach last Five 
years 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Authorised user breach in last Five years No No No No 
IT Fraud No No No No 
Theft of intellectual property No No No No 
National security No No No No 
In cloud computing No No No No 
Social engineering No No No No 
IT sabotage No No No No 
Accidently Authorised  user breach in last 
Five years 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
External threat Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Update security policy No No No No 
implement new security strategy No No No No 
Training and awareness No No No No 
Employee termination No No No No 
Other action No No No No 
IT Budget 
Between 3% 
and 9% 
Between 3% 
and 9% 
Between 3% 
and 9% 
Between 3% 
and 9% 
IT security budget of IT budget 
Less than 
10% 
Less than 
10% 
Less than 
10% 
Less than 
10% 
IT security budget for Insider Threat Less than 5% Less than 5% Less than 5% Less than 5% 
Concerns of Insider Threat Not at all Not at all Not at all Not at all 
Provide security awareness and training No No No No 
User groups No No No No 
How often attending SAaT Never Never Never Never 
DLP No No No No 
SIEM Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Proxy server Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ACL Yes Yes Yes Yes 
IDS Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Honey-tokens No No No No 
Document Tagging No No No No 
Other Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Security & Privacy controls integration to 
detect Insider 
No 
integration 
No 
integration 
No 
integration 
No 
integration 
External & Insider threats integration 
Not 
technology 
integration 
Not 
technology 
integration 
Not 
technology 
integration 
Not 
technology 
integration 
Network traffic Yes Yes Yes Yes 
other Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Employee termination period extra 
measures 
Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Login & logout Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Removable storage devices No No No No 
Emails Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Online activity Yes Yes Yes Yes 
False insider alerts 
Less than 
10% false 
Less than 
10% false 
Less than 
10% false 
Less than 
10% false 
Accidently by a staff Yes Yes Yes Yes 
by a staff who following guidelines  No No No No 
IT security system before or after the 
breach 
No No No No 
Other ways No No No No 
Low morale Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Poor performance in tasks Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Reduced efficiency No No No No 
Increased litigation No No No No 
increased or high turnover of staff Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Increase in long-term illness Yes Yes Yes Yes 
High absenteeism No No No No 
Industrial relation difficulties No No No No 
increase in accidents No No No No 
Deadlines not being reached Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Poor quality control No No No No 
 
Appendix C
Prediction Results with Different
Time Period Table
Table C.1: Prediction Result with Different Time Period
Case Time Rare Unlikely Possible Likely Certain
0 0 0.045 46.735 43.063 8.658 1.5
0 1 0.04 46.38 43.211 8.813 1.556
0 2 0.04 46.237 43.127 8.999 1.598
0 3 0.04 46.237 43.127 8.999 1.598
0 4 0.067 47.033 42.611 8.752 1.537
0 5 0.067 47.033 42.611 8.752 1.537
1 0 0.002 22.413 55.65 15.185 6.749
1 1 0.002 22.122 55.537 15.374 6.965
1 2 0.002 21.98 55.246 15.645 7.127
1 3 0.001 20.28 56.097 16.124 7.499
1 4 0.002 20.847 56.012 15.847 7.292
1 5 0.002 20.847 56.012 15.847 7.292
2 0 0.006 22.827 55.391 15.035 6.741
2 1 0.005 22.532 55.283 15.223 6.957
2 2 0.005 22.389 54.995 15.493 7.119
2 3 0.002 20.494 55.95 16.021 7.533
2 4 0.003 21.066 55.861 15.745 7.325
2 5 0.003 21.066 55.861 15.745 7.325
3 0 1.073 64.519 29.71 4.337 0.362
3 1 0.971 64.288 29.932 4.433 0.377
3 2 0.956 64.198 29.925 4.534 0.388
3 3 0.956 64.198 29.925 4.534 0.388
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3 4 0.934 58.935 33.791 5.528 0.812
3 5 0.934 58.935 33.791 5.528 0.812
4 0 0.058 30.845 50.985 12.763 5.349
4 1 0.052 30.499 50.974 12.945 5.53
4 2 0.051 30.336 50.76 13.188 5.664
4 3 0.051 30.336 50.76 13.188 5.664
4 4 0.089 32.909 49.542 12.427 5.032
4 5 0.089 32.909 49.542 12.427 5.032
5 0 0.002 22.002 56.129 15.642 6.226
5 1 0.001 21.717 56.018 15.837 6.426
5 2 0.001 21.579 55.726 16.118 6.576
5 3 0.001 19.959 56.547 16.592 6.901
5 4 0.001 20.518 56.462 16.307 6.711
5 5 0.001 20.518 56.462 16.307 6.711
6 0 0.065 56.489 37.591 5.548 0.307
6 1 0.058 56.17 37.794 5.659 0.319
6 2 0.058 56.064 37.766 5.785 0.328
6 3 0.058 56.064 37.766 5.785 0.328
6 4 0.148 57.763 36.423 5.383 0.283
6 5 0.148 57.763 36.423 5.383 0.283
7 0 0.224 50.234 40.112 7.551 1.879
7 1 0.202 49.882 40.274 7.691 1.951
7 2 0.199 49.739 40.205 7.855 2.003
7 3 0.199 49.739 40.205 7.855 2.003
7 4 0.131 43.506 43.83 9.347 3.187
7 5 0.026 33.566 48.973 11.693 5.742
9 0 0.063 47.832 42.347 8.271 1.487
9 1 0.057 47.478 42.501 8.421 1.543
9 2 0.056 47.336 42.424 8.599 1.585
9 3 0.056 47.336 42.424 8.599 1.585
9 4 0.157 49.429 40.921 7.949 1.545
9 5 0.157 49.429 40.921 7.949 1.545
11 0 0.689 62.232 32.243 4.601 0.234
11 1 0.623 61.969 32.464 4.7 0.244
11 2 0.614 61.876 32.453 4.807 0.251
11 3 0.614 61.876 32.453 4.807 0.251
11 4 1.209 63.249 30.838 4.474 0.229
11 5 1.209 63.249 30.838 4.474 0.229
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12 0 0.073 53.591 39.193 6.506 0.637
12 1 0.066 53.258 39.382 6.632 0.662
12 2 0.065 53.139 39.339 6.777 0.68
12 3 0.065 53.139 39.339 6.777 0.68
12 4 0.147 55.551 37.661 6.103 0.539
12 5 0.147 55.551 37.661 6.103 0.539
13 0 0.753 64.699 30.251 4.104 0.193
13 1 0.682 64.453 30.47 4.194 0.201
13 2 0.671 64.368 30.465 4.289 0.207
13 3 0.671 64.368 30.465 4.289 0.207
13 4 1.297 65.571 28.897 4.025 0.21
13 5 1.297 65.571 28.897 4.025 0.21
14 0 0.029 47.712 42.627 8.318 1.314
14 1 0.026 47.359 42.782 8.469 1.364
14 2 0.026 47.22 42.706 8.649 1.4
14 3 0.026 47.22 42.706 8.649 1.4
14 4 0.066 50.139 40.898 7.72 1.176
14 5 0.066 50.139 40.898 7.72 1.176
15 0 0.268 58.061 35.924 5.374 0.373
15 1 0.242 57.754 36.132 5.483 0.388
15 2 0.239 57.649 36.107 5.606 0.399
15 3 0.049 41.096 45.535 10.351 2.968
15 4 0.039 36.688 47.797 11.373 4.102
15 5 0.039 36.688 47.797 11.373 4.102
16 0 3.232 77.647 16.824 2.228 0.07
16 1 2.936 77.685 17.019 2.287 0.073
16 2 2.894 77.657 17.033 2.341 0.075
16 3 2.894 77.657 17.033 2.341 0.075
16 4 4.763 76.633 16.325 2.209 0.07
16 5 4.763 76.633 16.325 2.209 0.07
17 0 0.042 43.694 44.454 9.25 2.56
17 1 0.038 43.328 44.571 9.409 2.654
17 2 0.037 43.174 44.464 9.602 2.724
17 3 0.037 43.174 44.464 9.602 2.724
17 4 0.095 41.07 45.338 10.178 3.319
17 5 0.095 41.07 45.338 10.178 3.319
18 0 0.641 59.312 33.964 5.415 0.668
18 1 0.579 59.023 34.175 5.528 0.695
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18 2 0.57 58.914 34.151 5.651 0.714
18 3 0.57 58.914 34.151 5.651 0.714
18 4 1.119 60.132 32.706 5.342 0.701
18 5 1.119 60.132 32.706 5.342 0.701
19 0 0.971 59.599 32.734 5.6 1.096
19 1 0.878 59.321 32.943 5.717 1.141
19 2 0.864 59.204 32.916 5.844 1.173
19 3 0.864 59.204 32.916 5.844 1.173
19 4 1.923 60.002 31.031 5.704 1.34
19 5 1.923 60.002 31.031 5.704 1.34
20 0 0.027 45.11 44.004 9.075 1.784
20 1 0.024 44.751 44.139 9.235 1.85
20 2 0.024 44.604 44.045 9.428 1.899
20 3 0.024 44.604 44.045 9.428 1.899
20 4 0.064 46.234 42.976 8.882 1.845
20 5 0.064 46.234 42.976 8.882 1.845
21 0 0.17 53.56 38.746 6.606 0.918
21 1 0.154 53.226 38.933 6.734 0.954
21 2 0.151 53.102 38.886 6.881 0.98
21 3 0.151 53.102 38.886 6.881 0.98
21 4 0.06 30.364 50.634 12.795 6.147
21 5 0.06 30.364 50.634 12.795 6.147
22 0 0.288 57.307 36.226 5.657 0.522
22 1 0.26 56.996 36.43 5.772 0.543
22 2 0.256 56.885 36.401 5.9 0.558
22 3 0.256 56.885 36.401 5.9 0.558
22 4 0.234 52.315 39.228 7.187 1.037
22 5 0.234 52.315 39.228 7.187 1.037
23 0 0.194 55.261 37.747 6.131 0.667
23 1 0.175 54.937 37.942 6.252 0.693
23 2 0.173 54.82 37.905 6.39 0.712
23 3 0.173 54.82 37.905 6.39 0.712
23 4 0.479 57.019 35.928 5.883 0.691
23 5 0.479 57.019 35.928 5.883 0.691
24 0 1.336 64.888 28.887 4.414 0.475
24 1 1.209 64.672 29.111 4.512 0.495
24 2 1.191 64.581 29.104 4.615 0.509
24 3 0.248 50.402 39.65 7.61 2.09
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24 4 0.42 51.128 39.067 7.38 2.005
24 5 0.42 51.128 39.067 7.38 2.005
25 0 2.081 70.867 23.664 3.262 0.126
25 1 1.887 70.753 23.889 3.34 0.131
25 2 1.858 70.692 23.896 3.418 0.135
25 3 1.858 70.692 23.896 3.418 0.135
25 4 3.087 70.412 23.118 3.255 0.127
25 5 3.087 70.412 23.118 3.255 0.127
26 0 0.489 59.523 34.299 5.226 0.462
26 1 0.442 59.232 34.51 5.335 0.481
26 2 0.435 59.127 34.489 5.454 0.495
26 3 0.435 59.127 34.489 5.454 0.495
26 4 0.733 59.704 33.825 5.265 0.472
26 5 0.733 59.704 33.825 5.265 0.472
27 0 0.361 59.774 34.413 5.07 0.382
27 1 0.326 59.478 34.623 5.175 0.397
27 2 0.321 59.376 34.604 5.291 0.408
27 3 0.321 59.376 34.604 5.291 0.408
27 4 0.541 59.996 33.961 5.112 0.39
27 5 0.541 59.996 33.961 5.112 0.39
28 0 1.799 71.042 23.92 3.159 0.08
28 1 1.63 70.91 24.141 3.235 0.083
28 2 1.606 70.85 24.148 3.31 0.086
28 3 1.606 70.85 24.148 3.31 0.086
28 4 3.784 73.454 19.971 2.707 0.084
28 5 3.784 73.454 19.971 2.707 0.084
29 0 0.034 46.253 43.363 8.749 1.601
29 1 0.031 45.896 43.507 8.905 1.662
29 2 0.03 45.752 43.42 9.092 1.706
29 3 0.03 45.752 43.42 9.092 1.706
29 4 0.007 23.714 54.628 15.17 6.481
29 5 0.007 23.714 54.628 15.17 6.481
30 0 4.34 81.464 12.547 1.625 0.024
30 1 3.951 81.64 12.714 1.67 0.026
30 2 3.895 81.64 12.728 1.711 0.026
30 3 3.895 81.64 12.728 1.711 0.026
30 4 5.73 77.71 14.473 2.005 0.082
30 5 5.73 77.71 14.473 2.005 0.082
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31 0 0.112 50.681 40.39 7.306 1.512
31 1 0.101 50.331 40.556 7.443 1.57
31 2 0.099 50.194 40.493 7.602 1.612
31 3 0.099 50.194 40.493 7.602 1.612
31 4 0.244 49.372 40.533 7.897 1.954
31 5 0.027 22.822 53.96 14.089 9.102
32 0 0.885 62.853 31.357 4.601 0.304
32 1 0.801 62.603 31.579 4.7 0.317
32 2 0.788 62.51 31.569 4.807 0.326
32 3 0.161 52.231 39.265 7.115 1.227
32 4 0.438 53.883 37.722 6.703 1.254
32 5 0.438 53.883 37.722 6.703 1.254
33 0 0.256 54.94 37.6 6.279 0.924
33 1 0.231 54.614 37.792 6.403 0.96
33 2 0.227 54.492 37.751 6.543 0.987
33 3 0.227 54.492 37.751 6.543 0.987
33 4 0.588 55.234 36.602 6.44 1.136
33 5 0.588 55.234 36.602 6.44 1.136
34 0 0.042 47.271 42.668 8.281 1.738
34 1 0.037 46.913 42.815 8.43 1.804
34 2 0.037 46.77 42.734 8.608 1.852
34 3 0.037 46.77 42.734 8.608 1.852
34 4 0.066 49.009 41.44 7.941 1.545
34 5 0.066 49.009 41.44 7.941 1.545
35 0 0.338 55.637 36.9 6.153 0.972
35 1 0.305 55.315 37.094 6.275 1.01
35 2 0.3 55.193 37.055 6.413 1.038
35 3 0.3 55.193 37.055 6.413 1.038
35 4 0.507 55.864 36.429 6.206 0.994
35 5 0.507 55.864 36.429 6.206 0.994
36 0 0.075 52.253 39.918 6.913 0.84
36 1 0.068 51.914 40.1 7.045 0.873
36 2 0.067 51.789 40.049 7.199 0.897
36 3 0.067 51.789 40.049 7.199 0.897
36 4 0.194 54.225 38.289 6.516 0.776
36 5 0.194 54.225 38.289 6.516 0.776
37 0 0.081 45.937 43.182 8.786 2.014
37 1 0.073 45.577 43.319 8.942 2.089
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37 2 0.072 45.428 43.228 9.128 2.144
37 3 0.072 45.428 43.228 9.128 2.144
37 4 0.197 46.913 42.06 8.663 2.167
37 5 0.197 46.913 42.06 8.663 2.167
38 0 1.568 67.691 26.59 3.854 0.296
38 1 1.42 67.512 26.815 3.943 0.309
38 2 1.399 67.434 26.815 4.034 0.318
38 3 1.399 67.434 26.815 4.034 0.318
38 4 1.709 61.983 30.544 5.002 0.762
38 5 1.709 61.983 30.544 5.002 0.762
39 0 0.974 60.046 32.549 5.478 0.953
39 1 0.88 59.773 32.761 5.593 0.992
39 2 0.866 59.66 32.737 5.718 1.019
39 3 0.866 59.66 32.737 5.718 1.019
39 4 1.951 60.663 30.692 5.533 1.161
39 5 1.951 60.663 30.692 5.533 1.161
40 0 0.239 42.184 44.589 9.834 3.154
40 1 0.216 41.819 44.695 10.001 3.269
40 2 0.212 41.658 44.574 10.203 3.354
40 3 0.212 41.658 44.574 10.203 3.354
40 4 0.345 43.537 43.543 9.611 2.964
40 5 0.345 43.537 43.543 9.611 2.964
41 0 0.16 51.284 40.09 7.353 1.113
41 1 0.144 50.942 40.265 7.492 1.156
41 2 0.142 50.81 40.207 7.654 1.188
41 3 0.142 50.81 40.207 7.654 1.188
41 4 0.283 52.664 38.89 7.106 1.057
41 5 0.283 52.664 38.89 7.106 1.057
42 0 0.466 56.271 36.088 6.127 1.047
42 1 0.421 55.956 36.284 6.25 1.089
42 2 0.414 55.833 36.247 6.387 1.119
42 3 0.414 55.833 36.247 6.387 1.119
42 4 0.699 56.457 35.599 6.175 1.07
42 5 0.699 56.457 35.599 6.175 1.07
43 0 0.247 51.341 39.536 7.3 1.577
43 1 0.223 50.996 39.707 7.437 1.638
43 2 0.219 50.858 39.645 7.597 1.682
43 3 0.219 50.858 39.645 7.597 1.682
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43 4 0.37 51.588 39.06 7.367 1.614
43 5 0.37 51.588 39.06 7.367 1.614
44 0 0.015 47.019 43.034 8.484 1.448
44 1 0.014 46.664 43.183 8.637 1.502
44 2 0.013 46.523 43.102 8.819 1.543
44 3 0.013 46.523 43.102 8.819 1.543
44 4 0.033 49.023 41.564 8.005 1.375
44 5 0.004 25.496 53.659 14.574 6.267
45 0 1.6 64.963 27.995 4.641 0.801
45 1 1.449 64.755 28.216 4.745 0.835
45 2 1.426 64.657 28.205 4.853 0.859
45 3 1.426 64.657 28.205 4.853 0.859
45 4 2.381 64.733 27.428 4.645 0.813
45 5 2.381 64.733 27.428 4.645 0.813
46 0 0.209 57.431 36.52 5.478 0.364
46 1 0.188 57.12 36.726 5.588 0.378
46 2 0.185 57.013 36.699 5.713 0.389
46 3 0.185 57.013 36.699 5.713 0.389
46 4 0.467 59.599 34.536 5.115 0.282
46 5 0.467 59.599 34.536 5.115 0.282
47 0 0.352 60.911 33.863 4.712 0.162
47 1 0.318 60.624 34.078 4.811 0.169
47 2 0.313 60.53 34.064 4.92 0.174
47 3 0.313 60.53 34.064 4.92 0.174
47 4 0.67 63.32 31.468 4.405 0.137
47 5 0.67 63.32 31.468 4.405 0.137
48 0 0.289 60.217 34.487 4.79 0.216
48 1 0.261 59.924 34.7 4.89 0.225
48 2 0.257 59.827 34.684 5 0.232
48 3 0.257 59.827 34.684 5 0.232
48 4 0.434 60.466 34.048 4.832 0.221
48 5 0.434 60.466 34.048 4.832 0.221
49 0 0.733 64.984 30.266 3.954 0.063
49 1 0.663 64.742 30.489 4.041 0.065
49 2 0.653 64.661 30.485 4.134 0.067
49 3 0.653 64.661 30.485 4.134 0.067
49 4 1.096 65.067 29.796 3.977 0.064
49 5 1.096 65.067 29.796 3.977 0.064
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50 0 0.078 29.99 50.761 12.362 6.808
50 1 0.07 29.639 50.724 12.532 7.035
50 2 0.069 29.471 50.494 12.763 7.204
50 3 0.069 29.471 50.494 12.763 7.204
50 4 0.117 30.181 50.227 12.496 6.979
50 5 0.117 30.181 50.227 12.496 6.979
51 0 0.155 43.547 43.979 9.334 2.986
51 1 0.139 43.179 44.092 9.494 3.096
51 2 0.137 43.019 43.98 9.688 3.176
51 3 0.061 39.777 45.994 10.511 3.657
51 4 0.135 37.673 46.925 11.062 4.206
51 5 0.135 37.673 46.925 11.062 4.206
52 0 0.389 59.717 34.565 5.042 0.287
52 1 0.352 59.425 34.778 5.147 0.298
52 2 0.346 59.325 34.76 5.263 0.307
52 3 0.346 59.325 34.76 5.263 0.307
52 4 0.583 59.933 34.108 5.083 0.293
52 5 0.583 59.933 34.108 5.083 0.293
53 0 0.71 64.625 30.61 4 0.055
53 1 0.643 64.38 30.832 4.087 0.058
53 2 0.633 64.298 30.829 4.181 0.059
53 3 0.633 64.298 30.829 4.181 0.059
53 4 1.062 64.718 30.139 4.023 0.057
53 5 1.062 64.718 30.139 4.023 0.057
55 0 1.017 64.729 29.873 4.191 0.19
55 1 0.921 64.5 30.098 4.284 0.198
55 2 0.906 64.415 30.093 4.382 0.204
55 3 0.906 64.415 30.093 4.382 0.204
55 4 1.519 64.714 29.365 4.209 0.194
55 5 1.519 64.714 29.365 4.209 0.194
56 0 5.212 84.151 9.411 1.212 0.013
56 1 4.75 84.44 9.548 1.248 0.013
56 2 4.684 84.462 9.562 1.278 0.014
56 3 4.684 84.462 9.562 1.278 0.014
56 4 7.601 82.163 9.035 1.189 0.013
56 5 7.601 82.163 9.035 1.189 0.013
57 0 1.267 65.628 28.583 4.213 0.31
57 1 1.147 65.416 28.807 4.307 0.323
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57 2 1.129 65.331 28.803 4.406 0.332
57 3 0.269 44.863 42.399 9.341 3.128
57 4 0.132 37.776 46.886 11.038 4.168
57 5 0.132 37.776 46.886 11.038 4.168
58 0 1.358 65.805 28.209 4.242 0.387
58 1 1.229 65.598 28.433 4.337 0.403
58 2 1.21 65.511 28.428 4.436 0.415
58 3 1.21 65.511 28.428 4.436 0.415
58 4 2.023 65.659 27.674 4.251 0.393
58 5 2.023 65.659 27.674 4.251 0.393
62 0 1.425 66.886 27.264 3.994 0.431
62 1 1.29 66.69 27.486 4.085 0.449
62 2 1.27 66.606 27.483 4.178 0.462
62 3 1.27 66.606 27.483 4.178 0.462
62 4 2.122 66.705 26.734 4.001 0.438
62 5 2.122 66.705 26.734 4.001 0.438
63 0 0.016 44.612 44.237 9.145 1.99
63 1 0.015 44.25 44.366 9.304 2.064
63 2 0.015 44.101 44.268 9.497 2.119
63 3 0.015 44.101 44.268 9.497 2.119
63 4 0.025 44.907 43.782 9.246 2.041
63 5 0.025 44.907 43.782 9.246 2.041
64 0 3.322 77.805 16.608 2.196 0.068
64 1 3.019 77.852 16.803 2.254 0.071
64 2 2.976 77.826 16.817 2.308 0.073
64 3 2.976 77.826 16.817 2.308 0.073
64 4 4.895 76.752 16.109 2.176 0.068
64 5 4.895 76.752 16.109 2.176 0.068
65 0 0.117 52.655 39.478 6.837 0.913
65 1 0.105 52.317 39.66 6.968 0.949
65 2 0.104 52.191 39.611 7.12 0.975
65 3 0.104 52.191 39.611 7.12 0.975
65 4 0.288 54.339 37.885 6.557 0.931
65 5 0.288 54.339 37.885 6.557 0.931
69 0 0.273 52.375 38.871 7.04 1.44
69 1 0.246 52.035 39.048 7.175 1.496
69 2 0.242 51.9 38.992 7.329 1.537
69 3 0.027 42.724 44.664 9.64 2.946
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69 4 0.039 36.078 47.784 11.184 4.915
69 5 0.039 36.078 47.784 11.184 4.915
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